

香港大學社會科學學會

民主與社會

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序言

「民主與社會」，是社會科學學會於七九年度暑假舉辦的專題研究，目的為探討民主問題的各方面，掌握民主的要義，並分析香港及中國的民主問題；此外更希望透過研習，增進同學們的分析思辯能力，並使不同意見共交流。我們透過學習小組和講座，增進大家對民主的認識，此外，基於講座和學習組的局限性，我們特別出版了這本文集，希望更多同學、朋友們與我們一同探討分析問題。

文集內容包括了三方面——民主理論、香港民主問題和中國民主問題。我們很高興邀請到港大政治系兩位講師 Dr. J. Burns 和 Mr. S. N. G. Davies，以及港大亞洲研究中心金思愷先生為本文集撰稿。Mr. S. N. G. Davies 的“Problems of Democratic Centralism”一文，從哲學角度分析民主集中制的中心理論問題，深入而淺出。另一方面，Dr. J. Burns 在“Beijing's Unofficial Journals——What are they Saying?”一文中，為我們分析北京十本民辦刊物，探討他們對民主、人權、法制等的不同看法，有助大家了解中國的民主問題。金思愷先生的「毛澤東的民主與封建民主的互通點」，則旨在分析封建民主的實質，並具與共產黨所實行的無產階級專政的實際做法的互通點。

另一方面，在講座輯錄「民主在香港的前途」一文中，「社區組織協會」馮可立先生提出了「政治幾何——點、線、面」的分析方法，探討民主在香港的前途。

最後，文集亦包括了同學們好幾篇投稿。其中關乎民主理論的有「民主是甚麼？」和「民主——意識形態的革命」，前者提出一個統一民主概念對分析評價民主制度的重要性；後者則是從馬克思主義角度，透過對「疏離」，「實踐」兩個概念，分析民主的地位和作用。此外「大眾傳播媒介與中國民主問題」一文，則着眼探討傳播媒介在中國於反映民意，促進民主的重要性。還有「政府政治與民意途徑」及「香港民主意識初探」，都是討論到有關香港的民主問題。由於我們對民主問題的認識仍然有限，以上這些研討總結，或許都是一些不成熟的見解，但都願意與大家一同探討學習，希望大家多多賜教，深願這本小小的文集，能誘發大家更多關心週遭的問題。最後謹向所有曾經為這本文集盡力的朋友們致萬二分的謝意。

「民主與社會」專題研究籌委會

「民主與社會」專題研究
誠蒙下列人士熱心支持，
特此致謝。

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PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM

Mr. S.N.G. Davies

Theorists of democracy often make a distinction between 'Western' or 'liberal' democracy and 'Eastern' or 'People's' democracy¹. The point that is made by offering this distinction is one which establishes a basic difference of approach to the ideal of democratic rule as between the pluralistic 'Western' conception and the singularistic 'People's' conception. In the former government is concerned with broking between a plurality of voices; in the latter, government is concerned with establishing and acting in accordance with the one true 'people's' voice. In this latter conception the most widespread definition of how this process of establishment of the 'people's' voice is to be achieved can be found in the definition of democratic centralism. For in the rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the rules of the Chinese Communist Party it is explicitly stated that democratic centralism is the 'guiding principle'², or the 'organizational principle'³. In this short essay I am not going to concern myself with an exhaustive account of the Soviet or Chinese definitions of democratic centralism.

Nor am I going to plod laboriously through either an analysis of those definitions, or any attempt to assess Soviet or Chinese practice in the light of their stated rules. Instead I am going to try to isolate what seem to me to be the central theoretical problems which underlie such notions of democratic practice as democratic centralism.

To begin with then I shall offer a brief description of democratic centralism, then I shall suggest some reasons for why such an understanding of democratic practice might have come to be plausible. I shall then show that there are some grave problems implicit in such ideas, but I shall also argue that these grave problems are equally present in any theory of democracy.

It is sometimes thought that democratic centralism is self-contradictory. It would certainly be easy enough to devise a description of democratic centralism which would be self-contradictory. I intend, however, to try to give a description of democratic centralism which is as self-consistent as I can for unless this is done we will have learned little. Erecting conceptual straw men is a popular but in the end pointless sport only too often indulged in by political theorists. First of all, although in its usual presentation democratic centralism is a theory of single party government, it need not necessarily be so and I shall not elucidate it in those terms. It is, more generally, a theory of government which attempts to solve a variety of problems which are present in any modern, complex, mass society or any complex, mass organization at all. I shall identify three such problems as crucial. The first is the problem of a responsible and accountable decision making process. That is, in any democratic decision making process those who must bear the consequences of a decision must also have a hand in the making of that decision. As we shall see, the problem is, 'What sort of a hand?' The second problem is that presented by decision making as a complex process requiring extensive knowledge, judgement and expertise. That is, in any decision making at all, the important thing is to ensure that those who have the required knowledge and expertise are able to bring it to bear. As we shall see, the problems here are, 'How are we to know what is the required knowledge?', and 'How are we to know who is in possession of such knowledge?' The third problem is that presented by implementing decisions. That is, when decisions are made, their effectiveness will very much depend upon their being made at the right moment, their being put into effect at the right moment,

and their being followed through. As we shall see, the problems here are the most numerous involving such questions as, 'When is the right moment?', 'What is involved in following a decision through?', 'How and by whom is something put into effect?', 'Who is involved in following something through?'.

I have presented matters this way in order to try to show the logic of a theory of democratic centralism. For what I think is clear from what I have written so far is that in a decision making process of any complexity there are two principles at work. One, clearly evident in the first and perhaps the third problem area, is the principle of democracy. The other, very clear in the second problem area and present in the third, is the principle of centralism. Let me clarify this. In our normal understanding of making a decision we have specifiable problems, and a range of possible solutions both of which must be understood in a context. In this context and given the problems, we decide on a solution, or on occasions a list of possible solutions in an order of preference. But we each of us identify our own problems, if we can, and we accept responsibility for the consequences of our decisions. We are also our own arbiters as to what information we need in order to make whatever decisions we make. Finally, we generally stick by our decisions whilst reserving to ourselves the possibility of changing our minds. Individually speaking deciding is also choosing. In this account of decision making therefore I have tried to give the basis of the principle of democracy, since once the decision passes beyond the scope of the merely individual decision with relation to the merely individual problem, the notion of our personal responsibility for our own decisions is carried forward into what we mean by any more general understanding of a decision. A general, public decision is still in some sense a choice. If we look at what we normally mean by a decision in a slightly different way, however, we can also bring out the basis of the principle of centralism. For when we consider the idea of a decision it is quite clear that in deciding we need information and judgement and, whatever our problem, some certainty that whatever we do conclude is a solution we can in fact implement. And this certainty is given by our own centrality to the decision making process. If I understand a problem to be 'x', and the possible solutions to be 'y' and 'z', with my preference for 'z', and if the problem is my problem, then I can be reasonably certain that...

a) I understand it as such;

- b) I already have, or have access to any information required;
- c) I can solve the problem and act accordingly.

I am central to my own decision making and this makes it possible for me to make decisions. How would I make decisions if the understanding of the problem, the identification of the problem, had always to be done by another? How would I make decisions if both the understanding/identification and all that might be relevant to solving it and the actions necessary to solving it are all in others hands? In short, making decisions seems both to involve one's own responsibility for them, the basis of the principle of democracy, and it seems to involve an element of all this being concentrated, the basis of the principle of centralism. The theory of democratic centralism seems to be a theory in which at the level of large scale social decision making, both these principles are active.

What I have so far attempted to construct is a picture of the basis of democratic centralism, a picture of the problem that a theory of democratic centralism sets out to solve. In short, democratic centralism is an attempt to provide a theory of the decision making process of a large scale and complex society which acknowledges the logical grammar of the notion of a decision. Decisions must be made and they must be made by identifiable agents (or institutions) which can carry out whatever actions are consequent upon the decisions. The less decisions can be made, because of obstacles of various sorts, some of which I shall mention shortly; and the less they are made by identifiable agents (or institutions); and the less these decisions and the decision makers can actually implement the decisions, the less we have any going-on in a society which could reasonably be called a decision making process. Democratic decisions, however, must involve those whom the consequences of the decision affect. The agents (or institutions) cannot be wholly remote from the members of the society as a whole. That is, there must be a connexion between the generality of society and those agents (or institutions) which make decisions; a connexion which at its most direct makes the actual membership of society the decision makers.

This last idea, that of a one to one relationship between the membership of a society and the membership of the decision making agency (or institution) is normally expressed in the vocabulary of political theory as a theory of participatory democracy. But in a

large-scale and highly complex society such participatory theories seem ill suited to help us arrive at decisions. In the terms I have been using so far, what participatory democracy achieves is an understanding of decision making in a society which sacrifices all the centralist elements in the concept of a decision for the democratic element. Here what matters is that every member of society should be responsible in some way for the decision made insofar as it affects his or her life. Yet such an emphasis means that what is required for a highly complex decision to be made in a highly complex society, i.e. some centralization, is not present and decisions are hard to make and take a long time in the making. So a one to one relationship between the actual membership of a society and its decision makers either means that one must opt for a simple and small society, or it means that such a political theory is not appropriate for a large and complex society.

But largeness and complexity are not the only problems. One point that I made above about decision making was that it involved knowledge, expertise and judgement. And here we must face two problems in one. For on the one hand one may believe, as many do, that the required knowledge, expertise and judgement are very unevenly distributed in society. On the other hand, one may feel that what counts as knowledge, expertise and judgement in any society is in one way or another knowledge, expertise and judgement which speaks only to the interests of one or other particular group of people. In either event participatory models seem inadequate since they assume either that everyone is equally in possession of the required knowledge, expertise and judgement, or that even if everyone is in possession of some knowledge, expertise and judgement, it is knowledge, expertise and judgement favourable only to one particular group's interests. Here centralism of some sort seems necessary either because the decision making should lie in those hands of the few who have the relevant knowledge, expertise and judgement, or because it should lie in the hands of those who are able to emancipate themselves from biased knowledge, etc.

Democratic centralism then is a theory which is designed to meet the requirements of both the principle of democracy and the principle of centralism with respect to the major decision making of a given society. On the one hand, the theory offers an account of how it is that the decisions are in one way or another participated in by those who

have to bear the consequences of the decisions. On the other hand, the theory gives an account of how a) the few who have the relevant expertise, etc., are able to bring that expertise to bear at the appropriate moment, and b) how any partiality of interest which such expertise might serve is avoided. In theoretical terms democratic centralism holds that in a transitional society (between capitalism and communism) the mass of the people are their own best judge of their interests. However, because of the problems raised by remnants of bourgeois ideology, or in my terms, of the problems raised by partial interests, mistakes can be made and people can misunderstand their interests. Further, because of the structure of the preceding bourgeois society the relevant knowledge, expertise and judgement is not yet properly distributed amongst the broad masses. Finally and in any case, in a highly complex industrial society certain technical decisions, etc., require an expertise and knowledge that is highly specialized and unlikely ever to become equally distributed. All decisions therefore must be made by suitably qualified people in response to the interests of the broad masses as they are expressed, but only after these expressions have been properly understood and interpreted. Once these interests have been properly articulated the highly centralized apparatus for implementing decisions (the same apparatus as understood in the decisions) can go ahead.

It seems clear enough that in many ways this is a very anthropomorphic model. For just as one might view the sensory inputs from one's nervous system as being organized in one's brain,⁴ and one's brain as sending out the instructions for action (acts), so the central decision making part of a society organized along democratic centralist lines is viewed as functioning like the brain. Likewise, if one's brain has misinterpreted the nervous signals, so, as the action progresses, sensory input will indicate this misinterpretation, and similarly, if the central decision making apparatus in a society has misinterpreted the interests of the broad masses, so their reactions will come back up through the apparatus indicating misinterpretation. But I want to ask, is such an anthropomorphic model relevant as a model of the decision making model of society?⁵ And here I want to return to the series of questions which I posed earlier. These are:

- 1) What sort of a hand in the decision making process is to be had by those who bear the consequences of any decisions?
- 2) How are we to know what is the required knowledge for any

- problem to be identified and any decision to be made?
- 3) How are we to know who is in possession of such knowledge?
 - 4) When is the right moment for making and implementing any decision?
 - 5) How and by whom is any decision put into effect?
 - 6) Who is involved in following decisions through?
 - 7) What is involved in following any decision through?

I want to look at each of these questions in turn, though it will become evident that my explorations of each of them are connected with each other. Trying to answer one question is also trying to answer them all.

The first question revolves around the idea of those feeling the consequences of any decision effecting their own lives having some sort of a hand in the making of that decision. The problem is, what sort of a hand? I have already noted that implicit in the idea of a decision is the responsibility for its making and its consequences that is borne by the decision maker. Hence at the very least any political decision seems to require that whoever makes decisions is responsible for them and hence is to be accountable. Here, therefore, there must be an identifiable institution or identifiable agents who are responsible and can be held accountable for decisions which are made. The hand had in the process by those feeling the consequences of a decision must be, therefore, one of holding decision makers to account where those decision makers are not the people feeling the consequences themselves. This would be a minimum democratic requirement. Hence in democratic centralism we should expect to find readily identifiable institutions and agents, and a genuine possibility of them being called to account. I think it fair to say that at least in theory, if not in the practice of democratic centralists, these requirements are met. I shall return to the problems of practice later. In theory there are identifiable party bodies responsible for decisions the membership of which is known, thus giving identifiable agents. The structure of the party, theoretically, is such that these agents can be held to account.

But the decision makers are those who hold that decisions are based upon knowledge and expertise. Hence any holding to account must be a holding to account which is grounded upon a full grasp of the relevant knowledge, etc., involved. But here the question arises, what is the relevant knowledge? This is the most deeply puzzling area in all of

democratic thought. For here we are not only faced with the consequences of an increasing specialization of labour, and hence of the accompanying specialization of language. But we are also faced with a modern awareness that knowledge is not innocent. By this I mean that we are now aware of the problems implicit in the notions of 'false-consciousness', 'class ideology' and their cognates. At one and the same time we seem to be recognizing the necessity and the authority of the fully trained specialist and the possibility that the specialist may well be a specialist whose knowledge is tilted towards one group of interests rather than either any other group, or, in the most usual case, to the interests of all. And here lies the crux. For as between democratic centralists and other sorts of democrats there is a divide over what constitutes 'the interests of all'. Are these an astonishing diversity pulling in many different directions? Or are they really fundamentally one without the realization of which no other, more trivial individual interests can be met at all? In democratic centralism it is held that there is indeed one such fundamental interest, and more important, it is held that this fundamental interest is known. Hence there is a need for decision makers who a) have access to all relevant specialist knowledge necessary for the making of complex decisions for a complex modern society, and who b) are also supposedly protected from biased or partial uses and structuring of this specialist knowledge by being members of a society organized on democratic lines. That is, the specialists make decisions, but they make them in response to urges from the society as a whole identifying from the multiplicity of urgings the one voice of the people or society as a whole.

Accordingly the answer to the third question is that knowledge of who is in possession of 'relevant' knowledge is: specialists of two kinds. Above all specialists at identifying the true, united will of the people as a whole (what in less glorified language is sometimes called 'the public interest'). And these primary specialists are backed up by those who have other, more particular specialist knowledge with respect to economic, scientific, and other similarly qualifiable areas of expertise.

Fourth, once this has been duly attended to then society is in possession of an organizational structure, appropriately staffed with specialists, for identifying the right moment for making and then implementing decisions. Fifth, sixth, seventh they are also therefore the people most closely involved in following a decision through. For once

the decision has been made the feedback begins, informing the decision making centre of the correctness of its diagnosis and the appropriateness of its remedies. And what is important here is that indeed and again, only the specialist can identify correctly those occurrences which medical men call 'sequelae'.

Now of course the standard objection to all of this is that political decisions are not like this. There is no such unified societal interest, nor can there be any specialist knowledge which could give access to such a general interest even supposing it to exist. Each person is their own best judge and each person's interests are, even if similar to any other's, ultimately that person's interests and no one else's. Certainly society should be served by experts in specialist areas of knowledge, but these people should be no more than instrumental to the achievement of goals which have been identified in other, non-technical ways. But the objection to these ideas would point out that people are not all that often that good at identifying their own interests, least of all if one supposes a distinction between short term and long term interests. It would also show that it is quite sensible and feasible to identify whole groups of people as sharing broadly identical interests and often these broadly identical interests come down to denying the interests of some other group. And, furthermore, it might be claimed that we can know all this only because specialist knowledge can show it to us. A science of society enables us to have precise enough knowledge to avoid the sort of pitfalls into which we would fall, or into which we have fallen, unguided by relevant experts.

I have put the matter that way because I want to show the extent to which the understanding of human society upon which democratic centralism is based is an extremely common one. It is an understanding which most people share. For it says no more than that the right decisions will only be made and acted upon if the requisite knowledge is brought to bear, and they will only be made at the right moment and implemented with due expedition if the process of decision making is centralized and unhindered by the befuddlement of the ignorant. Further, only the experts can really interpret the results of any decision properly. As Aristotle points out, the person wearing the shoe is the only person to judge whether or not it fits, yet only the cobbler knows what to do about it, for he is most likely to know whether comfort is merely a matter of 'wearing the shoe in', or only to be achieved by

remodelling the shoe. It is an understanding of the business of government that is ultimately elitist, or at least meritocratic. For what it says in short is, 'Let the people decide, but let us also ensure that they do not make the wrong decision'. And that view is very widespread in other traditions than democratic centralism.

Let me briefly offer two examples. One from one who is taken to be a great libertarian; the other from a doctrine at present thought to be drastically authoritarian. John Stuart Mill in his *Considerations on Representative Government* argues that only if people participate in the political process will they have any self-respect and will society progress.⁶ Yet equally, in *On Liberty*, he gives clear grounds for mistrusting the collective wisdom of the majority.⁷ Accordingly, when Mill gets down to talking of the mechanics of a representative system he erects two safeguards to ensure, like democratic centralists, that the educatively necessary participatory political process does not end up in mistakes. First he rigs the franchise. Mill is a believer in an unequal franchise in which the better educated get more votes than those with only an elementary education. For Mill argues that without such safeguards the majority will tend to tyrannize the minority and will do so in the direction of a conformist mediocrity which puts a halt to any true progressiveness in society. Hence Mill wishes to ensure that only those with knowledge and expertise are elected to the major decision making offices of a society, and he does this by giving to people whom he deems to have themselves knowledge and expertise a powerful influence in voting. In order to ensure this Mill then argues against a secret ballot on the grounds that if people's votes are up against public scrutiny, people will be a great deal more careful about how they vote for it will always be possible that they will be called upon to justify their choice. Mere conformity, or a bought vote will hence be less powerful factors in people's voting behaviour. Both of these ideas revolve around ensuring that people who are affected by decisions have a hand in their making and leave in the hands of experts the actual decision making. Mill also wishes to see a bureaucracy staffed with those with the relevant knowledge and expertise. Hence the outcome is a form of government which takes away with one hand what it has given with the other with respect to the participatory power of the majority of people.

The other example which I want to look at briefly is that of the

social theories of Islam. These are often held to be extremely authoritarian by those who find Islamic regimes displeasing, and yet are often held by Moslems to be extremely democratic. How can this be? Again I think that my analysis of democratic centralism provides some illumination. For in Islamic doctrine there are two elements that parallel what I have offered as the two principles of democracy and centralism. These are the principles of *ijmah*, *qiyas*, and *ijtihad* which, roughly speaking, mean 'the consensus of the community', 'argument by strict analogical reasoning' from the Qur'an & the Sunnah, and 'individual thought'. The directing force behind the Moslem faith is the word of God as revealed to Mohammed and is to be found in the Qur'an and in the prophetic Sunnah. But neither the Qur'an nor the Sunnah speak unambiguously to the problems that the faithful meet every day. Hence there is a need for interpretation. It is here that *ijmah* and *ijtihad* come in. For the consensus of the community (the Islamic *ummah* is the conception of the community here) is what in the end counts. And, although in cases of great doubt and uncertainty *ijtihad*, or individual thought may be resorted to, such thought is carefully governed not only by the principle of *ijmah* but also by the centrality of *qiyas* which means 'argument by strict analogical reasoning'. And therefore any tendency which one might think *ijtihad* would encourage towards a democratic individualism which might question the faith, or at least shake any uniformity of doctrine and belief, is controlled first of all by the force of communal consensus which in its turn is directed by the centrality of the Qur'an and the Sunnah which are to be interpreted only by strict rules (*qiyas*) known and used best by the mullahs, or the priesthood. The community is trusted, but not too far. The purity of the faith is in the end guaranteed by those deemed its most wise and faithful servants.

Mill mistrusted the democratic majority because he thought their mediocre prejudices would stand in the way of enlightened progress. The correct decisions for a progressive society had to be in the hands of the enlightened few. But simultaneously Mill saw the educative value of political participation as well as the moral necessity for it. Consequently he attempted a theory of democracy that would somehow reconcile the two. In a similar way Islam indicates a feeling that unguided, the faithful may stray from the paths of righteousness. Yet simultaneously it recognizes that the faithful constitute the practice of the faith and the community that is necessary for that practice. Islam therefore founds its faith on four principles which permit change, but only change fitting with the faith as given and directed by its guardians, the

priesthood. Change is only change towards a more Godly society. One might call Mill's view progressive and that of Islam conservative, yet both view human society in broadly similar terms. Democratic centralism, it seems to me, is merely one more way in which this profound ambivalence towards the socio-political side of human life appears in theory. It is an ambivalence which lies at the heart of any attempt to take concepts of decision making and extend them from the realm of individual decision, whence they come, to the realms of public decision making. For the individual is the authoritative centre of his or her own decision making, that is what marks him or her out as an individual. But how is this notion to be transferred to a collectivity of individuals and the decisions that have to be made for that collectivity? What is the authority here and where is it centred?

I have argued to this point because I wanted finally to bring out what seems to me the central element in any theory of democratic centralism. This is that it is an attempt to establish an authoritative centre to the making of decisions which affect the whole of society. And this is also what any political theory must do, and according as to the weight that is attached to the 'authority' or to the 'centre' depends the 'democratic' or the 'centralist' element. I do not think that there is a happy compromise position that is not, in the end, something of an illusion. And this is the more so, the more complex and massive socio-political units get. For if one wants the right decisions made at the right moment, and if one wants the results of these decisions to be properly monitored and quickly acted upon, then one will want expertise and information operating centrally. Similarly, if one wishes these decisions and actions to be responsible and accountable, then also one wants an identifiable set of institutions and agents that can be held to account, and the more central these are, the more readily they are identifiable and yet able to act and act with the required expertise. Yet at the same time one wishes to retain one's own authority for decisions which have a major effect on one's life. The question that democratic centralism points towards is one of major importance in modern politics. For we must decide, and decide soon whether big is efficient even if it is not beautiful, or whether small is both beautiful and efficient. In short, whether we are content to pass the decisions effecting our lives to others because they are in various ways 'expert', or whether we should keep the decisions to ourselves and happily bear with the consequences of our lack of expertise.

Notes

- 1) See the discussion in C.B. Macpherson, *The real world of democracy*, Oxford University Press, 1968; B. Holden, *The nature of democracy*, Nelson, 1974, esp. Ch. 1; J. Plamenatz, *Democracy and illusion*, Longman, 1973, and many others.
- 2) Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted by the 22nd Party Congress, 1961 and amended by the 23rd Party Congress 1966, and 24th Party Congress 1971, article 19 and passim.
- 3) Constitution of the Communist Party of China, adopted by the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 1977, General Programme, and article 8, and Ch. II passim.
- 4) This is, of course, a grossly simplified model of even a lay view of human action, but for all that I suspect that it summarizes fairly the view most people have of the mechanics of the mind.
- 5) I shall leave on one side the question of whether such a model is at all relevant for decision making in a society for although I personally see this as a central problem in political theory, it is not my purpose to discuss it here.
- 6) *Considerations on Representative Government*, in *Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Representative Government*, ed. and intro. A.D. Lindsay, Everyman, 1968, Chs. 1-3.
- 7) J.S. Mill, *op.cit.*, Introductory and passim.

BEIJING'S UNOFFICIAL JOURNALS: WHAT ARE THEY SAYING

John P. Burns

The unofficial publications¹ which have appeared in limited numbers mainly in Beijing since October 1978, are usually portrayed as raising similar issues from generally similar perspectives, focused on demands for more democracy, greater protection of human rights, and strengthening of the legal system. Yet it is obvious that the authorities in Beijing, who have suppressed some journals and not others, recognize significant differences among the positions taken by these publications. What, then, are the positions of the unofficial journals on such topics as 'democracy', 'human rights', and 'the rule of law'? How to these positions differ from the official view? Finally, on what other issues do the journals differ?

In addition to analyzing the definitions of 'democracy', 'human rights', and 'the rule of law' offered by the journals, we can best illust-

rate the range of opinion expressed in them by focusing on three issue areas: 1) 'the four basic principles' (Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought; the role of the Communist Party; the dictatorship of the proletariat; and socialism);² 2) the past 30 years of Chinese history, especially the nature of the Cultural Revolution; and 3) the legitimacy of the present post-1976 regime. The most radical journals, such as EXPLORATION, have consistently challenged official orthodoxy in all three areas, while the more moderate journals, such as PEKING SPRING and APRIL 5 FORUM, have affirmed the official interpretation in these areas. The issues are, of course, linked. An attack on the 'four basic principles' can be seen as a rejection of the present regime's legitimacy. But not all journals questioning this legitimacy have attacked the 'four principles'. Which journals have taken stands on these issues, and whether the journals can be ranged along from most critical to most supportive of the government a continuum/are the objects of this study.

Because the unofficial journals are circulated in limited numbers among a small group centered mainly in Beijing, of what significance are their views, much less the differences among them? First, in so far as unorthodox positions on key issues are being advocated, even by a small group, it indicates that the channels for the means of political socialization in China are varied, and that political socialization into one ideological pattern is incomplete. Second, because foreign news services broadcast the content of Beijing's unofficial publications to other parts of China, the influence on provincial intellectuals of the debates carried out within this forum may be wider than is sometimes realized. Finally, by examining specifically the differences among the journals we can come to a more precise understanding of what challenges to official orthodoxy the authorities in Beijing are prepared to accept.

Although few complete collections of unofficial journals are available outside China, sufficient numbers have been obtained to permit at least a preliminary survey for comparative purposes. Data for this paper comes from the ten unofficial journals published in Beijing wholly or partially available in English translation:³ PEKING SPRING, VOICE OF THE PEOPLE, EXPLORATION, SEEK THE TRUTH JOURNAL, APRIL 5 FORUM, ENLIGHTENMENT, CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS LEAGUE JOURNAL, THAW, DEMOCRACY AND THE TIMES, and MASS REFERENCE NEWS. These journals in translation

are the most complete collection in either Chinese or English available to me.

Issues of these journals published from October 1978 to April 1979 are included in this study. By April 1979 the arrests of some editors of the journals⁴ and the publication of notices in Beijing and other large cities curtailing the use of wall posters and demonstrations,⁵ had a chilling effect on the activities of the unofficial publishers. We can, then, more easily see the differences among the journals by concentrating on the earlier period.

DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW.

One of the most striking similarities of the unofficial journals was their claim to be speaking for the people. A joint statement issued in January 1979 and signed by most of the publications, claimed that the journals were "run by the people of Beijing."⁶ The Human Rights League in February 1979 affirmed that it "would act according to the will of the people."⁷ And APRIL 5 FORUM asserted in April that it was "the people's mouthpiece."⁸ In the name of the people, then, the journals demanded democracy, human rights, and a return to legality.⁹ "People want democracy and freedom. This is the desire and hope of the people. Anyone who attempts to obstruct and suppress the democracy movement will come to no good."¹⁰ If the language of the journals was the same — democracy, human rights, and legal system — what did they mean by these concepts?

At least three different notions of democracy appear in the unofficial journals: 1) democracy as rule in the interests of the people; 2) democracy as a guarantee of equal rights for all; and 3) democracy as rule through certain procedures (election and recall) to ensure that people can participate and/or supervise governmental decision-making. The first two notions stress the results of governmental activity as indicators of whether the system is democratic. The last notion emphasizes the procedures used as the most important measure. These conceptions of democracy can all be found in the unofficial journals, and indeed even in the same journal.

The attack on Deng Xiaoping made by one journal is evidence of the view that democracy means rule in the interests of the people.

"Deng is no longer worthy of the people's trust and support," the journal argued, "because his actions have shown that he does not want to pursue democracy. He no longer safeguards the people's interests."¹¹ This view attaches little importance to how officials achieve power, focusing instead on their actions in power. If they act in the interests of the people, then the system is democratic.

The second notion of democracy, which defines it in terms of human rights, also focuses on the results of governmental activity. Systems are democratic, in this view, if they guarantee "the equal rights of all."

Democracy recognizes the equal rights of all human beings. . . it provides all with an equal opportunity to realize human rights because it is founded on the recognition of everyone's equal right to live.¹²

A system, then, which ensures these equal rights is democratic in this view.

More frequently, democracy in the unofficial journals is tied to certain procedures, and relies heavily on election outcomes and voting rights. This notion is based on the view that

democracy means letting people be masters of their own affairs. It means that people have the right to exercise control over all things in human society as they desire, including control over economic, political, cultural and social affairs.¹³

This view of democracy emphasizes how decisions are made — democracies put the people in a position to decide,¹⁴ giving them "the final say in crucial matters, and matters of concern to them."¹⁵ Democracy means the people having a decisive influence on the destiny of society:¹⁶ it means the people influencing, controlling, and supervising government decisions.¹⁷ Such a system entails the "transfer of power to the laboring masses."¹⁸

Elections are an important procedure for realizing this kind of democracy.¹⁹

True democracy means the right of the people to choose their own representatives, to work according to their will and in their interests. The people must also have the power to replace their representatives any time so that these representatives cannot go on deceiving others in the name of the people.²⁰

This notion of democracy depends, then, on elections "conducted from the bottom up and which are modeled on the Paris Commune."²¹

Although these conceptions of the meaning of democracy differ, the unofficial journals share the view that democracy is a means to further ends, and is not an end in itself. Democracy is usually seen in the journals as a means of achieving the 'four modernizations'. "Democracy is a means not an end. The purpose of democracy is to concentrate various forces to serve the 'four modernizations'. Democracy is a prerequisite for their realization."²²

Some journals, however, go much further than this, pointing out that modernization itself is a means to yet further goals. One journal suggests that modernization is a means to "happiness, which Chinese citizens can truly enjoy, to freedom, prosperity, wealth and power."²³ Why must human history take the road toward prosperity and modernization?

The reason is that human beings need a prosperous society to produce realistic fruits to provide them with maximum opportunity to pursue their first goal of happiness, namely freedom. Democracy means the maximum attainable freedom so far known by human beings. It is quite obvious that democracy has become the goal in contemporary human struggles.²⁴

"The people's desire for democracy and the nation's desire for wealth and power are irresistible" proclaimed one journal.²⁵ These are not demands for social justice or for equality, on which the party rose to power, but demands for some measure of freedom from party control to pursue the goals first advocated by Yen Fu and later by the May Fourth Movement. Indeed the journals quite self-consciously draw the parallel between the movements of the early 20th century and the needs of China today as they see them.²⁶ The instrumental nature of

the conception of democracy is clear. Democracy is seen as a way of modernizing the country, and, at least by some journals, as a means of achieving freedom for the people, and wealth and power for the nation.

The unofficial journals also agree that the notion of democracy should not be linked to either centralism or dictatorship. This view runs directly counter to the official view that democracy must be seen in terms of dictatorship, and which sees democratic centralism as a unified concept.²⁷ In general, the journals deny that democracy must be linked to centralism or to dictatorship. Such a link is logically impossible, for dictatorship negates democracy, and centralism prevents its effective operation.

While official discussions of democracy also define democracy in terms of "the people's right to determine and direct the nation's affairs, and making the people the masters of their own house,"²⁸ democracy and dictatorship of the proletariat are seen as inseparable concepts. Only by means of dictatorship, in the official view, can the democratic rights of the proletariat be guaranteed. And although democracy is indispensable, it is only part of a total concept, democratic centralism. Without centralism, the unity and stability needed to govern effectively cannot be attained. These views are ignored by the unofficial journals.

A uniform list of prerequisites for realizing democracy is not offered by the journals. Democracy can be achieved, some journals say, by "awakening and emancipating the people's minds,"²⁹ by first achieving a redistribution of power (or democratization) of economic management,³⁰ by "reforming the political system"; and by "strengthening the legal system" either concurrently with the growth of democracy, or after democracy has begun to take hold. The close relationship between achieving democracy, on the one hand, and protection of human rights and strengthening the legal system, on the other, is emphasized in all the journals. It is to these concepts that we now turn.

Although there is no general agreement on a definition of democracy, there does seem to be some measure of agreement on the importance and content of human rights. First, the appeal for human rights is made in universalistic language in the journals:

Man has the right to live more meaningfully. The reason man

must have these rights is that life will not be worth fighting for without such rights. Once a man loses his human rights, he loses his rights as a human being, and what is left to him is but a subservient position always subject to enslavement by others.³¹

The official view, while accepting the existence of human rights, denies their universality. In capitalist societies, for example, human rights "cannot involve all men. They are only the rights of the bourgeoisie."³² There is, then, disagreement on the status of human rights.

The most systematic discussion of the content of human rights in the unofficial journals occurs in APRIL 5 FORUM. Human rights here are analyzed in terms of "citizen's rights" and "people's democratic rights". Citizen's rights include: rights of living, multiplying, education, giving free reign to creativity, and developing individuality enjoyed by individuals living in society, such as labor, rest, education, freedom of marriage, freedom of movement, freedom to select one's occupation, personal freedom, freedom from violation of life and property, etc. "People's democratic rights" include: protection of the determining influence of the people's will on the state and society and, as the legitimate rights of the citizens, include the rights of information, speech, and supervision.³³

Other unofficial journals conceive of human rights as voting rights, freedom of speech and the freedom to demonstrate, freedom of publication, belief and association,³⁴ activities necessary for a functioning democracy if the more procedural notion is adopted. A more detailed and idiosyncratic list comes from the Human Rights League, which includes the now familiar freedom of speech, voting rights, the right to information, and rights to publication, all mentioned above.³⁵ Other publications are satisfied with the 'citizen's rights' listed in the 1978 Constitution, again including freedom of speech, press, and assembly.³⁶

The official view argues that conceiving human rights as political rights, or as 'democratic rights' in APRIL 5 FORUM's analysis, is too narrow. The concept must be broadened to include "social, economic, and cultural rights" as well. These rights are collectivist in nature, and unlike bourgeois human rights do not take the protection of private property as a fundamental principle. (Note that the APRIL 5 FORUM list of human rights includes protection of individuals and individuality,

as well as protection of property.) The proletariat, the official view continues, cannot restrict itself to the bourgeois demands for liberty and equality, but must put forth its own 'higher demand', for the realization of socialism and communism.

The official view does, however, recognize 'citizen's rights', which are a kind of human rights, and these have been incorporated in the 1978 Constitution. If, however,

the slogan of human rights is put forth in abstract terms and in deviation from our fundamental slogan (realize socialism and communism), especially under the circumstances when extremely complicated content has been infused into the slogan, it will only dim our objective and cause confusion in our minds.³⁷

Human rights, the official view concludes, "is not a major slogan of our party."³⁸

Both the official and unofficial positions on human rights concur that the rights are relative, restricted in the words of BEIJING REVIEW by "certain material conditions and cultural level."³⁹ As one unofficial journal has pointed out:

Freedom does not mean unprincipled freedom. Exercise of the right of freedom is limited by non-interference in other people's freedom and non-denial of other people's freedom.⁴⁰

Although recognizing the limits of human rights, both positions see reasons for the limits in different terms. The official view is essentially materialist, while the unofficial position suggests that human rights are limited by man's need to live in society. Nonetheless the relative and limited notion of human rights is a common theme.

If, according to the unofficial journals, human rights are a necessary part of a functioning democracy, so too is a 'strong' legal system. While most journals recognize this, they rarely go beyond the simple statement: Democratic rights "should be clarified by a series of legal provisions and insured by a strict judicial system and proceedings for rights to be legally exercised." A 'strong' legal system, thus, seems to be an essential characteristic of democracy in the unofficial view.

The rule of law does not mean democracy, however, for law can be used by both democracy and autocracy alike. Whether or not the legal system ensures democracy

depends on the nature and substance of the political system concerned . . . We want the rule of law, but we want the kind of rule of law which is conducive to the realization of the equal rights of man.⁴¹

If democracy must be based on a 'strong' system of laws, it must also precede the establishment of the rule of law.

We do not merely mean that democracy is complete after a set of laws have been written. Democracy must be realized before laws are established. Then a legal system is set up to recognize it and protect it. Before the people and the masses have obtained a true democracy, a complete set of laws that recognizes democracy and a strong system that protects the democratic system will be meaningless. To avoid empty talk, the first thing to do is to allow democratic theory to become reality.⁴²

In addition to promulgating new laws, some hint of what 'strengthening' the legal system entails is provided in an APRIL 5 FORUM analysis of a Central Committee decision to remove the labels of 'four bad elements'.⁴³ The journal deplored the extreme vagueness and ambiguity of the wording of the decision, arguing that as a result local officials have almost complete discretion to do as they please. Objective standards were lacking, which makes the policy meaningless. Scientific, unambiguous language is required.⁴⁴ The tendency toward vagueness and ambiguity finds its source in Mao's own writing, the journal concludes. Precise, unambiguous wording of the laws is one aspect of 'strengthening' the legal system.

While the concepts of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are used by all the unofficial journals, often with different meanings as we have seen, I have found no major grounds for differentiating among the journals based on these definitions. Where the concepts have differed there has not been a consistent difference among the journals — indeed different meanings for the various concepts can occasionally be found in the same issue of the same journal! There are, however, clear editorial differences if we consider the unofficial journals' positions on the 'four principles'; the Cultural Revolution; and the legitimacy of the present post-1976 regime.

THE FOUR PRINCIPLES.

The 'four principles', featured in the 1978 Constitution, include upholding Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought; the leadership of the Communist Party; the dictatorship of the proletariat; and the socialist road. One unofficial journal, EXPLORATION, has openly attacked the accepted official position on each principle.⁴⁵ The other journals have either affirmed or ignored the principles. We will see, then, that there are grounds for differentiating among the journals based on a consideration of these principles. We turn now to a review of the evidence, looking at each of the four principles in turn.

EXPLORATION's attack on China's dominant ideological system, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, takes the form of an objection to a "single ideology having been pushed through by force." The journal bases its attack on 'single ideologies' on its analysis of the relationship between society and the individual:

Human beings have two natures — individuality and sociality. People's sociality depends on individuality just as human societies necessarily depend on the existence of individuals. Therefore, we conclude that people's individuality enjoys priority over their sociality, although both are important constituents of human nature. . . . Human society like the universe is pluralistic and not monistic.⁴⁶

The journal then endorses a pluralistic approach to the question of ideology: "Let every Chinese think freely." The implication that Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought must be abandoned as the only single legitimate doctrine in China is explicitly stated in the same issue of the journal.⁴⁷ Suppressing all other viewpoints has left China with the "emotional and cultural reality we face now," the journal points out, "including deadliness, numbness, stupidity, stagnation, ignorance, and simplemindedness."⁴⁸

Today we challenge Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought because we are fed up with your (the authorities) unreasonableness. If the existence and triumph of Marxism-Leninism must rely on bloody suppression of all opposing views, we as clear-headed youths of the 20th Century are not prepared to tolerate it.⁴⁹

The journal concludes:

If the road we choose raises the people's standard of living, though incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, we must not hesitate to jettison the later. Dogmas such as the 'inviolability of Marxist-Leninist principles' expounded by Mao Zedong, and the pledge "to hold high and defend the great banner of Chairman Mao" provided in the existing Constitution represent utter ignorance of the purpose of human existence.⁵⁰

The notion of a single legitimate ideological mould into which all people must be fitted, is, then, rejected as unsuitable for any society.

The other journals have either taken an intermediate position, indicating that Marxism-Leninism as the only legitimate ideology is acceptable (although perhaps needing modification), or have endorsed Marxist-Leninist principles without qualification. THAW and ENLIGHTENMENT are examples of journals which while accepting a general Marxist-Leninist framework, have called for revision of some of its basic tenants. The Thaw Society has called for revision of the "impractical portions of Marxism," and in particular deletion of concepts of "class struggle, violent revolution and all types of dictatorship."⁵¹ It also would remove the "outdated portions" of Mao Zedong Thought. In the same spirit, ENLIGHTENMENT has called for a restoration of the "scientific features" of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.⁵²

Unqualified endorsement of the ideology, to complete the other end of the spectrum, characterized the editorial policy statements of APRIL 5 FORUM and PEKING SPRING.⁵³

Criticism of the second basic principle, the role of the Communist Party, follows a similar pattern, EXPLORATION's critique of the Party's position stems from its rejection of a single ideology imposed by force on the Chinese people:

Those who use force to put down opposition views to defend the existing program and policy of the Chinese Communist Politburo are actually working against the wishes of the Chinese people for modernization.⁵⁴

Not only will the policy of modernization fail, but all progress is jeopardized if the party is permitted to maintain its position:

The Chinese people have learned from years of autocratic dictatorship that if we permit the Communist Politburo to exercise exclusive control, permit a few to prescribe a lifestyle for several hundred million people, and permit the use of force to suppress theories and opinions different than Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the end result will be to turn China back to the 'anti-rightist' days of 1957, and back to the days of the Cultural Revolution of 1966. Please remember that Mao Zedong once predicted that this kind of revolution will occur once every seven or eight years.⁵⁵

EXPLORATION's denunciation of one-party rule is explicit. The critique is all the more powerful because it is not aimed at the party organization itself, but rather at the highest leadership organ of the party — the politburo.

ENLIGHTENMENT occupies the other end of the continuum. In November, 1978, it fully endorsed "the strategic plans of the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua," and saw itself as an ally of the party press, PEOPLE'S DAILY.⁵⁶ And in January 1979 it reaffirmed this position: "We mean what we say about accepting the party's leadership and guidance in the political, economic, cultural, and various spheres."⁵⁷

Intermediate positions are taken by APRIL 5 FORUM, PEKING SPRING, and THAW. While affirming their support for "the fundamental principles of the party," each journal suggested either that the party's leadership position be altered, its internal composition changed, or that at basic levels the party "whither away" as class struggle has diminished. APRIL 5 FORUM questioned the role of the party in society, pointing out, first, that "party leadership" has not always been correct (e.g., the "reactionary" lead of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four are recalled) nor has it always been necessary (e.g., the "revolutionary and spontaneous Tiananmen incident" is cited). Of the later, APRIL 5 FORUM asks, "Here even without party leadership, as we can clearly see, has not a soul-stirring melodrama already been enacted?"⁵⁸

THAW argues that the party, for too long the personal possession of Mao, must be converted into a party "belonging to all party members and people throughout the country," that its decision-making system must be made more "democratic collectivist," and that it be clearly separated from the state.⁵⁹

While fully accepting the party's guiding role, PEKING SPRING argues that just as class struggle is withering, so too should the role of the party at basic levels. "People have felt more and more strongly that the power of the administrative leadership of basic level party organizations has now become an obstacle to the development of production." The journal hastens to add, however, that it does not advocate "total abolition of party leadership at this stage," and points out that the process must be gradual. Middle and upper-level party leadership is necessary "at this stage", and should not be "done away with".⁶⁰ These moderate statements which basically accept party leadership, contrast sharply with the views expressed in EXPLORATION as we saw above.

The third principle, support for the dictatorship of the proletariat, is also challenged by EXPLORATION. Interestingly, the other journals have little to say on this subject, and I could find no explicit statements supporting or challenging the concept in them. Support for the notion of dictatorship of the proletariat may perhaps be inferred for those journals, like APRIL 5 FORUM and PEKING SPRING that have explicitly endorsed Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and party leadership.

EXPLORATION's attack on proletarian dictatorship, and indeed on any dictatorship, is based on its conception of democracy as entailing a guarantee of equal rights for all. Dictatorship "negates the fact that different members of society have the right to satisfy their different desires." Thus, the dictatorship of the proletariat (or any dictatorship) denies man's right to live as equals. It denies each man's

right to carry out political activities to satisfy his personal desires in life and to fight for survival — and this is the out and out negation of the most fundamental principle of democracy.

It ignores, then, society's basic pluralism. "This explains why all social systems based on Marxist socialism are without exception undemocratic

and even anti-democratic autocracies," the journal concludes.⁶¹ Given democracy, and the respect for the equal rights of every other member of society which democracy entails, dictatorship is impossible.

Not only is any kind of dictatorship a negation of democracy, but the Marxist notion of "dictatorship by the majority" is simply an "Utopian dream". Dictatorship is always dictatorship. "A concentration of powers is bound to fall into the hands of a few." Thus, the democratic movement, EXPLORATION argues, "is being carried out on the premise of negating the Mao Zedong-type dictatorship, and is aimed at reforming the social system."⁶²

Finally, support for socialism is a feature of the 'four basic principles'. EXPLORATION has attacked the notion that establishment of a Marxist socialist state can ever lead to democracy. But the journal does not disapprove of socialism per se (indeed socialism is seen as letting the people be their own masters). Rather the journal argues that socialism has not been achieved in China. Here EXPLORATION draws a clear line between socialism in general, and Marxist socialism. The latter negates democracy because it relies on dictatorship, while the former is defined in terms of democracy — "people being their own masters." But, the journal asks of the Chinese people:

With the meager wages you get every month, whose master and what kind of master can you be? Sad to relate, you are 'mastered' by somebody else even in the matter of matrimony. Socialism guarantees the producers' rights to the surplus production from their labour over what is needed as a service to the society. But this service is limitless (in China). So, are you getting only that little miserable wage 'necessary for maintaining the labor force for production'? Socialism guarantees many rights, such as the right of a citizen to receive education to use his ability to the best advantage and so forth. But none of these rights can be seen in our daily life.⁶³

The implication then, is that the 'socialist' state in China is not only a fraud, claiming to be what it is not, but that it is also exploiting its workers by paying them only enough to maintain the labor force in production. EXPLORATION does not, however, reject socialism, but only socialism as it is practiced in China.

Apart from one statement in PEKING SPRING in which it is announced that the journal "adheres to the socialist path," the other journals do not explicitly address this issue. We can infer from their support for Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and for party leadership, however, that they do not share the EXPLORATION critique.

There is, then, adequate ground for distinguishing among the journals based on their position on the four basic principles. A radical critique of the ideology, party, and state is offered by only one of the journals, and appears to be based on a definition of democracy in terms of human rights — in particular, that democracy means guaranteeing the equal rights of all in society. At the other end of the spectrum can be found PEKING SPRING and APRIL 5 FORUM. Journals like ENLIGHTENMENT and THAW occupy an intermediate position, characterized by general support for the principles, but calling for important revisions of their content.

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Their stand on the 'four principles' leads the unofficial journals to differing appraisals of the past 30 years of Chinese history, and in particular to differing conclusions about the nature of the Cultural Revolution. The more moderate journals confine their criticism of the past 30 years exclusively to the Cultural Revolution years (1966-1976), denouncing the "evil and pernicious" influences of Lin Piao and the Gang of Four. It was during this period that the "dictatorship hosts were turned into objects of dictatorship" and peoples' democratic and human rights were abused.⁶⁴ This position differs little from the official view. The moderate journals see the cause of the Cultural Revolution misfortune in terms of a 'weak' legal system.⁶⁵ The people had no real legal protection from the dictators, Lin Piao and the Gang of Four. Hence the moderate emphasis on the rule of law.

EXPLORATION, on the other hand, sees the entire 30 years as one of "tyranny and dictatorship,"⁶⁶ and does not, in general, single out the Cultural Revolution years for special treatment. The journal's comments on the Cultural Revolution are, however, very interesting, because it sees this movement in a different light. The Cultural Revolution, EXPLORATION argues, began as a popular democratic mass movement:

The Cultural Revolution demonstrates that the Chinese people want democracy — it was the first occasion for them to demonstrate their strength, and all reactionary forces trembled before them.⁶⁷

The campaign was, however, corrupted by the leadership, who sought to turn it to their own ends.

Because the people had then no clear orientation and the democratic forces did not play the main role in the struggle, the majority of them were bought over by the autocratic tyrant, led astray, divided, slandered, and finally violently suppressed. Thus, these forces came to an end.⁶⁸

The more moderate journals confine their attack to the Cultural Revolution years, endorsing the progress made before that time. The most radical position, adopted by EXPLORATION, condemns the previous 30 years, but looks for inspiration to the spontaneous democratic elements of the early Cultural Revolution, reflecting in its analysis the disillusionment of the more radical Red Guards.

LEGITIMACY

Different positions were also taken by the journals on the legitimacy of the present post-1976 regime in China. More radical opinion on this issue, defining democracy in terms of elections, questions the

legitimacy of the current leadership. Who elected them? asks EXPLORATION, HUMAN RIGHTS LEAGUE, and ENLIGHTENMENT. "Although the people may favor some of the deputies, the Fifth National People's Congress does not enjoy due authority because it is not the direct embodiment of the people's will."⁶⁹ And, ENLIGHTENMENT points out: "the supreme leaders of the state still do not have the courage to be elected by the people."⁷⁰ EXPLORATION, always the most outspoken, suggests that "the masses are dissatisfied because state leaders have won the people's trust by fraud. . . ."⁷¹ And in a direct challenge to the Peking Municipal Committee, the journal points out: "In fact, no one has entrusted you with the task of ruling. You do not represent the people."⁷²

We would like to ask a question of senior government officials who have incited the arrest of people: Do you hold power legally or illegally (legitimately or illegitimately)? We would also like to ask a question of Chairman Hua and Vice Chairman Deng, Do you hold your posts of premier and vice premier legally or illegally?⁷³

The attack on Deng is taken even further:

He is no longer worthy of the people's trust and support, because his actions have shown that he does not want to pursue democracy. He no longer safeguards the peoples' interests. He is currently following a dictatorial road after deceitfully winning the people's trust.⁷⁴

This attack on the regime's legitimacy may also help to explain why intellectuals in China have failed to rally to the journals' support. Although intellectuals could be expected to champion demands for increased democracy, reduction of the arbitrariness of the legal system, and the protection of human rights — especially liberalization of academic and literary discussion and publishing rights — they cannot have been happy with the attack on Deng's legitimacy. He, after all, was leading the liberalization, and restoring 'unity and order'.

Second, the most radical journal, *EXPLORATION*, in its rejection of the 'four principles', lashed out at Marxist intellectuals and theoreticians — "Let us look at the real history of China, and not the history written by the hired scholars of the socialist government," the journal demanded.⁷⁵ The 'hired scholars' were precisely those intellectuals in China who if the defense of democracy had been more moderate, might have supported the journals. As it was, they were indicted along with the state and party bureaucracy, and never gave their support.

CONCLUSION

While adopting a common language — democracy, human rights, and the rule of law — the unofficial journals have used the terms 'democracy' and 'human rights' in a variety of ways, which, however, often ran directly counter to official usage. But there are grounds for differentiating among the journals. Their position on the 'four principles' the Cultural Revolution; and the legitimacy of the present regime, suggest that the journals can be ranged along a continuum from the more radical and openly critical journal, *EXPLORATION*, to the journals generally supportive of the regime, such as *PEKING SPRING* and *APRIL 5 FOURM*. Other journals, such as *ENLIGHTENMENT* and *THAW*, occupy an intermediate position.

The fact that such unorthodox views can be expressed in China, while not surprising, indicates that political socialization into a common ideological tradition is far from complete. Views directly contradicting official thinking have been expressed occasionally by all of the journals surveyed here, and consistently by one journal, *EXPLORATION*. This journal's radically different use of terms such as 'democracy', and 'human rights', in addition to its denunciation of the 'four principles', unorthodox interpretation of the Cultural Revolution, and its open challenge of the legitimacy of the present regime, have led to its suppression by the authorities. Which of these characteristics finally prompted official Beijing to act remains, however, unknown.

NOTES

¹ The journals call themselves 'unofficial' or 'mass' publications, while the government has sought to label them 'underground' or 'other' publications. These labels have been protested by the journals.

² See *BEIJINGREVIEW* No. 49, December 7, 1979, p. 3 for a statement of the 'four principles'. They appear in Chapter I, Articles 1 and 2 of the 1978 Constitution of the People's Republic of China.

³ The translations appear in "Translations on People's Republic of China," U.S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE (abbreviated JPRS hereafter) Nos. 509 (April 12, 1979); 520 (May 10, 1979); 532 (June 20, 1979); 533 (June 1979); 534 (26 June 1979); and 536 (June 29, 1979) (Washington, D.C.: National Technical Information Service) and "China Report" FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE (hereafter abbreviated FBIS) Nos. 5 (July 27, 1979) and B (August 9, 1979) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce).

⁴ See AFP dispatch, Beijing, May 30, 1979 in *SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST*, May 31, 1979; and AFP dispatch, Beijing, May 2, 1979, in *SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST*, May 2, 1979.

⁵ See Reuter's dispatch, Peking, March 31, 1979 in *SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST*, April 1, 1979.

⁶ *EXPLORATION* (TANSUO), Jan 29, 1979 in JPRS 520, p. 26.

⁷ *HUMAN RIGHTS LEAGUE* (ZHONGGUO RENQUAN) Feb 1979, in JPRS 520, p. 64.

⁸ *APRIL 5 FORUM* (SIWU LUNTAN) Apr 1, 1979, in FBIS 8, p. 21.

⁹ See *PEKING SPRING* (BEIJING ZHI CHUN) Jan 27, 1979 in JPRS 532, p. 36, for a similar statement.

¹⁰ *ENLIGHTENMENT* (QIMENG) Mar 1979 in JPRS 520, p. 51.

¹¹ *EXPLORATION* Mar 25, 1979 in JPRS 520, p. 28.

¹² *Ibid.*, Jan 29, 1979 in JPRS 536, p. 32.

¹³ Ibid., Mar 11, 1979 in JPRS 520, p. 31; ENLIGHTENMENT Jan 1, 1979 in JPRS 520, p. 58; APRIL 5 FORUM Apr 1, 1979 in FBIS 8, p. 5.

¹⁴ EXPLORATION Mar 11, 1979 in JPRS 520, p. 33.

¹⁵ PEKING SPRING Jan 27, 1979 in JPRS 520, p. 15.

¹⁶ APRIL 5 FORUM Apr. 1, 1979 in FBIS 8, p. 21.

¹⁷ EXPLORATION Mar 11, 1979 in JPRS 520, p. 33; and APRIL 5 FORUM Apr 1, 1979 in FBIS 8, p. 21.

¹⁸ EXPLORATION Dec 1978 in JPRS 534, p. 11. and EXPLORATION Mar 11, 1979 in JPRS 520, p. 33.

¹⁹ APRIL 5 FORUM Dec 30, 1978 in JPRS 536, p. 17.

²⁰ EXPLORATION Dec 1978, in JPRS 534, p. 11.

²¹ PEKING SPRING Jan 9, 1979 in JPRS 520, p. 1.

²² APRIL 5 FORUM Apr 1, 1979 in FBIS 8, p. 5; EXPLORATION Dec 1978, in JPRS 534, p. 22; and ENLIGHTENMENT Jan 1, 1979, in JPRS 509, p. 45.

²³ EXPLORATION Dec 1978 in JPRS 534, Pp. 11; and DEMOCRACY AND THE TIMES (MINQUH YU SHIDAI) undated in FBIS 5, p. 65.

²⁴ EXPLORATION Dec 1978, in JPRS 534, p. 13.

²⁵ PEKING SPRING Jan 9, 1979 in JPRS 532, p. 1.

²⁶ See ENLIGHTENMENT Nov 24, 1978 in JPRS 509, p. 28.

²⁷ One possible exception comes from ENLIGHTENMENT which points out: "Without democracy it is also impossible to achieve highly centralized and unified command in modernization. Without a competent and authoritative command and co-ordination system which is adopted through democratic processes . . . and constantly renovated, modern machines are just a heap of scrap iron." Jan 29, 1979 in JPRS 520, p. 45.

²⁸ "Learn from Chairman Mao to Struggle for Carrying Forward Democratic Concepts and Fully Implement Socialist Democracy", PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH (ZHEXUE YANJIU) No. 12, Dec 25, 1978 in JPRS 073179, p. 40.

²⁹ APRIL 5 FORUM Apr 1, 1979, in FBIS 8, p. 5.

³⁰ PEKING SPRING Jan 9, 1979 in JPRS 532, p. 1.

³¹ EXPLORATION Jan 29, 1979 in JPRS 536, p. 32.

³² PEKING REVIEW No. 45, November 9, 1979.

³³ APRIL 5 FORUM Mar 11, 1979 in FBIS 5, pp. 12-13.

³⁴ ENLIGHTENMENT Jan 1, 1979 in JPRS 509, p. 65.

³⁵ In its DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, the HUMAN RIGHTS LEAGUE Lists the following:

- freedom of thought and speech;
- right to criticize and assess party and state leaders;
- right to 'sufficient autonomy' for minority nationalities;
- right to elect state leaders and the leaders at all levels in various areas, and to elect a 'citizens court' to be a standing committee of the National Peoples Congress;
- right to examine the national budget, final financial statements and the gross national product;
- right to attend proceedings of the NPC, its standing committee and preparatory meetings.
- reduction and gradual abolition of state ownership of the means of production;
- establishing friendly relations with Yugoslavia, Soviet Union, US and Japan;
- the right to develop freely;
- freedom to go in and out of foreign embassies, freedom to talk to foreign correspondents and freedom to publish abroad;
- freedom to receive 'nei-bu' publications, to subscribe to foreign magazines and newspapers, and to listen to foreign television and radio stations, to publish and print.
- freedom to choose one's own vocation, freedom to express support for a leader or a movement;
- state guaranteed food rations;
- right of reassignment for educated youth in the countryside;
- abolition of the use of deceptive means to recruit technical workers;

- abolition of the system of secret police;
- abolition of slums and overcrowded housing conditions;
- encouragement of internationalism, with open borders, trade, exchange of labor, freedom to work and study abroad, to travel or live abroad.

³⁶ EXPLORATION Dec 1978 in JPRS 534, pp. 6-7, EXPLORATION also mentions "freedom of travel, and the freedom to live a civilized life which man should enjoy . . ." Jan 29, 1979, in JPRS 536, p. 39. The 1978 Constitution of the People's Republic of China recognizes the following rights: right to vote, freedom of speech, correspondence, press, assembly, association, procession, demonstration, and the freedom to strike, freedom of religion, of person, right to work, to rest, to material assistance in old age or in case of injury of illness, right to education, freedom to engage in scientific research, literary and artistic creation, and the right to lodge complaints. In BEIJING REVIEW No. 11, March 17, 1978.

³⁷ BEIJING REVIEW No. 45, November 9, 1979, p. 19. ³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 20 and EXPLORATION Jan 29, 1979 in JPRS 536, p. 44; APRIL 5 FORUM Apr. 1, 1979, in FBIS 8, p. 5.

⁴⁰ ENLIGHTENMENT Jan 1, 1979 in JPRS 509, p. 65.

⁴¹ EXPLORATION Jan 29, 1979, in JPRS 536, p. 32.

⁴² ENLIGHTENMENT Jan 1, 1979 in JPRS 509, p. 58.

⁴³ The 'four bad elements' included landlords, richpeasants, counter-revolutionaries, and rightists.

⁴⁴ APRIL 5 FORUM Mar 11, 1979, in FBIS 5, p. 24.

⁴⁵ BEIJING REVIEW Dec 7, 1979 p. 3

⁴⁶ EXPLORATION Dec 1978, in JPRS 534, p. 17.

⁴⁷ Ibid., Jan 1979, in JPRS 536, p. 41. ⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 89. ⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 44.

⁵⁰ EXPLORATION Jan 29, 1979, in JPRS 536, p. 42.

⁵¹ THAW (JIE DONG) Mar 8, 1979 in FBIS 5, p. 6.

⁵² ENLIGHTENMENT Oct 11, 1978 in JPRS 509, p. 16.

⁵³ APRIL 5 FORUM Dec 30, 1978 in JPRS 536, p. 10; and PEKING SPRING Jan 9, 1979 in JPRS 532, p. 1.

⁵⁴ EXPLORATION Jan 29, 1979 in JPRS 536, p. 42.

⁵⁵ EXPLORATION Jan 29, 1979 in JPRS 536, p. 41.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ APRIL 5 FORUM Apr. 1, 1979 in FBIS 8, p. 30.

⁵⁹ THAW Mar 8, 1979 in FBIS 5, p. 6.

⁶⁰ PEKING SPRING Jan 1979, in JPRS 520, p. 15.

⁶¹ EXPLORATION Mar 11, 1979 in JPRS 520, p. 31.

⁶² Ibid., Mar 25, 1979 in JPRS 520, p. 28.

⁶³ Ibid., Dec 1978, in JPRS 534, p. 10.

⁶⁴ VOICE OF THE PEOPLE (JENMIN ZHISHENG) Dec 1978, in JPRS 534, p. 1.

⁶⁵ SEEK THE TRUTH JOURNAL (QIUSHI 8AO) Feb 1979 in JPRS 534 p. 18.

⁶⁶ EXPLORATION Mar 25, 1979 in JPRS 520, p. 38.

⁶⁷ Ibid., Dec 1978, in JPRS 534, p. 13.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ HUMAN RIGHTS LEAGUE Mar 22, 1979 in JPRS 520, p. 61.

⁷⁰ ENLIGHTENMENT Mar 1979 in JPRS 520, p. 51.

⁷¹ EXPLORATION Mar 11, 1979 in JPRS 520, p. 42.

⁷² Ibid., Jan 29, 1979 in JPRS 520, p. 23.

⁷³ Ibid., Mar 25, 1979 in JPRS 520, p. 28.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ EXPLORATION Dec 1978, in JPRS 534, p. 13.

編注：文內所提及之報刊中文原名如下：

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|---------|
| 1. PEKING SPRING | 北京之春 |
| 2. VOICE OF THE PEOPLE | 人民論壇 |
| 3. EXPLORATION | 探索 |
| 4. SEEK THE TRUTH JOURNAL | 求是報 |
| 5. APRIL 5 FORM | 四五論壇 |
| 6. ENLIGHTENMENT | 啓蒙 |
| 7. CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS LEAGUE JOURNAL | 中國人權同盟報 |
| 8. THAW | 解凍 |
| 9. DEMOCRACY AND THE TIMES | 民主與時代 |
| 10. MASS REFERENCE NEWS | 羣衆參考消息 |
| 11. BEIJING REVIEW | 北京周報 |

毛澤東的民主與 封建民主的互通點

——金思愷——

對於目前中國共產黨的民主運動，外界論者大都以歐美的民主概念來解釋、評價、推論，這是一種基于主觀願望脫離中國實際的評估。其實，國民黨的辛亥革命和「五四運動」都是民主運動，即使在中共統治大陸以後，亦曾有過幾次運動涉及到民主，大鳴大放期間的某些言論，李一哲的大字報，也在不同程度上鼓吹某種民主。這也就是說，經過了七八十年的鼓吹，並未搞出一個歐美模式的民主中國來。原因當然很多，基本上是中國封建專政下的民主傳統根深蒂固地潛伏在中國人的腦子裡，以為「民為貴」就是歐美模式的民主。這是中國在民主問題上的歷史實際。

除了歷史實際以外，還需注意現實政治的實際。中國共產黨所領導的政權，實行着無產階級專政下的民主，如果幻想其將放棄無產階級專政，那就不成其為共產黨了。因此，不管其如何鼓吹，只能是無產階級專政下的民主。

封建專政的民主與無產階級專政的民主固然有着本質上的不同，但畢竟都是專政的民主。這一方面說無產階級專政民主能為中國人接受的根本原因；而另一方面則說如果只像以前那樣將這種批判停留于紙面上不作落實^①，則走上封建民主的舊路而不自知。

沒有別的辦法，只有老老實實地將封建民主的實質全盤托出，再將中國共產黨所實行的無產階級專政民主的實際做法與封建民主類似之處列出，這些類似之處，就是它們的互通點。本文亦着眼於此。

(一) 封建專政的基本架構

若說中國封建專政下的民主，即「民為貴」的思想，是整個封建專政基本架構的一部分，不能將之抽離孤立地與歐美民主相等同，那麼，必須先認識這個基本架構，才能正確認識「民為貴」這種所謂民主思想的封建性；亦可由此而找出無產階級專政下的民主和封建民主之間的通道。

中國封建專政基本架構的中心是皇帝，皇帝是怎樣來的？天命。即「君權天授」。

西周為了推翻殷商王朝之，提出「非我小國敢弋殷命，惟天不昇」，「天惟時求民（之）主。」^②這裡所說的民主，是指人民的主人。據說是孔子所編選的尚書有這樣的評論：「皇天上帝，改厥元子，茲大國殷之命。」^③意思是說：上帝改派了他的長子，接收殷商的統治。從那時開始，歷代皇帝均以天子自居。東漢黃巾起義的口號是「蒼天已死，黃天當立」；^④元末明初之小說水滸傳，描述梁山泊英雄造反，也提出「替天行道」的口號，足見「君權天授」這種思想深入于民間。

從這個中心統治人物皇帝出發，孔子提出社會等級和人與人之間的職分：「君君、臣臣、父父、子子」，^⑤從民之主的思想看來應該有一個「民民」。與此相對的是「君不君，臣不臣，父不父，子不子」和「民不民」。意思是說，社會的人，都是搞清楚所面對着的人，必須遵守王倫、王典的准則：「父子有親、君臣有義、夫婦有別、長幼有序、朋友有信」，父義、母慈、兄友、弟恭、子孝。^⑥西漢董仲舒提出「罷黜百家，獨尊儒術後」，依據孔子上面的說法，力証「君為臣綱」、「父為子綱」，夫為妻綱「這三綱「可求于天」。^⑦說「天子受命于天，諸侯受命于天子，子受命于父，臣妾受命于君，妻受命于夫，諸所受命者，其尊于天也」。^⑧即這種人與人間的關係，都受天命的支配。至宋，理學家朱熹以天理、道德、滅欲等理論來加強固定「君仁、臣忠、父慈、子孝」等社會關係的原則。

這種社會關係原則，統稱為禮。孔子說：「上好禮，則民易使之。」^⑨荀子說：「國家無禮則不寧。」^⑩強調禮，是為着「民易使」，國家安寧，故曰禮治；說穿了，就是封建統治術。禮治，要求社會中人遵守禮，孔子要人「克己復禮」，^⑪孟子強調「反身而誠」，^⑫朱熹要求「滅人欲」，「臣子無說君、父不是底道理」，^⑬並且抽出禮記中的「大學」、「中庸」兩篇與論語、孟子並列為四書，作為科舉取士的初級標準書，把知識分子的思想在啓蒙時節就以禮控制起來。

在這個禮治系統中，父子、夫妻、兄弟所構成的家庭佔着重要地位。從而又突出「孝」，說：「孝，禮之始也。」^⑭至清，還有人認為「以孝治天下」。^⑮之外，又要求婦女守節，說「餓死事極小，失節事極大」。^⑯從而也可以知道中國的家庭、家族制度何以如此繁複。

在這個封建專政系統中的臣，是各級官吏。臣的原義是男奴，要其「危身事上」，「靈承于旅」^⑰；「事上」，「靈承」，即奉承上級，善奉他人。而在另一方面，古時實行封土，受封者在封土之內亦稱君統治人民。^⑱廢封後，各級官吏仍以君的態度對待人民。約始于宋初，民間多稱州官縣令為「父母官」

。⑲這當然可解釋為要像父母那樣看待人民，但其真正目的則是要求人民像對待父母那樣孝、敬他們，這就是「民民」的真義。

由上可見，這種封建系統，由上而下來說是：天子、臣、家長、個人。若從個人來說，則要求：「誠意、正心、修身、齊家、治國、平天下」，^⑳是即「學而優則仕」^㉑的來由；總起來的做法是「窮天理、明人倫、講聖言、通世故」。^㉒

確實：孟子說過：「民為貴，社稷次之、君為輕」^㉓的話，若將之孤立起來看，除了君民相對的封建意識以外，好像是說民比君尊貴。但若將之置于上述封建專政系統中，就可知這是一種規勸，要為君者不要過份，與孟子的另一規勸，「君之視臣如土芥，則臣如寇仇」^㉔具有同樣意義；前者是君民關係，後者是君臣關係，是封建專政的基本架構的構成部分。若一定要說這就是民主，那麼是封建民主。在歷史上最早尊孟子的唐朝的韓愈說得最坦白：「君者，出令者也。臣者，行君之令而致之民也。民者，出粟米麻絲，作器皿，通貨財以事其上者也。」「民不出粟米麻絲，作器皿，……以事其上，則誅。」^㉕難道民主是這樣的嗎？

這裡單說禮治，並不是說完全沒有法治。雖然歷代情況各有不同，但基本上是根據董仲舒的德刑並用，實行以禮治為基礎輔以刑罰的統治原則。^㉖當然這裡所說的法治局限於刑法，若將之包括議會憲法之類，則二千年來根本未曾出現過。由此而不難理解，所謂「治國」，其基本目的是維持王朝的統治，其他工作都基于對統治有利與否。例如董仲舒在土地兼併問題上就曾說：「使富者足以示貴，而不致于驕；貧者足以養生，而不致于憂。以此為度，而均調之，是財不匱，而上下相安，故易治也。」^㉗

當然，外國也不能沒有道德規範作為德治這一面，但並不像中國那樣的嚴格的落實到「君君、臣臣、父父、子子」這種社會組織關係之中。這一套禮的統治方法，即使是外族入主中原，也很欣賞。例如：滿清皇帝康熙就曾盛讚朱熹在禮治方面的貢獻，強調他有「忠君愛國之誠」，「立億萬世一定之規」。^㉘是故，它並不因改朝換代而削弱，而是愈後愈加強。

綜合起來說，中國封建專政的基本架構，是由天命，落實於「君君、臣臣、父父、子子」，這種社會組織關係的禮治為骨幹所構成。

(二) 革命權威與天命

列寧說：「工人階級為了全世界進行艱巨的頑強的鬥爭以爭取徹底的解放，是需要權威的。」^㉙這種革命權威的基礎，是他們據以革命的社會發展規律。它雖然是基於唯物論，而認為人類社會循原始公社社會，奴隸社會、封建社會，資本主義社會、社會主義社會、共產主義社會的次序而發展，但從必然性這一點來說，這種唯物論証結果與天命所定之間，並無差別。

列寧又說：「培養一批有經驗，有極高威信黨的領袖，這是一件長期的艱苦的事情。但不要這樣做，無產階級專政、無產階級的「意志統一」，就會成為一個空話」。^㉚這句話中的「一批」，從各國共產黨的革命歷史來看，而是應該有一個突出于「這一批」之上的領袖。在俄國革命之前與奪得政權的初

期，是列寧，繼之者是斯大林，現在則是勃列日涅夫；不僅在轉換期間，而且經常強調集體領導，前後還是突出個人。在中國，則是毛澤東。這也就是說，這種革命權威，前後必然落實到一個突出的革命領袖。原因何在？

根據唯物的認識論的解釋，一個革命領袖權威的建立，是因為他能夠及時地集中反映當時社會發展的趨勢，反映當時條件下人們的願望和革命要求。而這種革命要求，往往遭到舊習慣勢力的壓制，不可能立即明白表達或見諸於行動。一羣革命領袖面對這種情況，認識不會相同；由此而產生了路線鬥爭。這種多次路線鬥爭的過程，就是由「一批」革命權威轉而突出一個革命權威的過程。

路線鬥爭，並不一定決定於多數少數。毛澤東強調：「新的正確的東西，在開始的時候，往往得不到多數的承諾。」④在共產黨的革命歷史上，成功的革命領袖，往往在若干重要路線鬥爭開始時，處於少數地位，通過鬥爭與實踐轉為多數。列寧在反對第二國際，俄國革命的初期，都是黨內少數派。毛澤東在一九三五年以前，由抗日戰爭轉為解放戰爭時期，社會主義改造時期，大鳴大放和文化大革命的初段，於黨的中央委員會中都居於少數地位。少數者的路線要讓全黨執行，當然要有條件。一種是多數派路線執行結果失敗了，不得不改變路線；另一種是少數派領導的範圍具有某種獨立性，實踐的結果，擴大了影響力，打倒多數派；再一種是少數派的革命權威壓倒多數派。

這樣的路線鬥爭，由上可見，是結合着實踐檢驗的，因而強調羣衆路線：「將羣衆的意見集中起來，又到羣衆中去作宣傳解釋，化為羣衆的意見，使羣衆堅持下去，見之於行動，並在羣衆行動中考驗這些意見是否正確。然後再從羣衆中集中起來，再到羣衆中堅持下去。如此無限循環，一次比一次更正確，更生動，更豐富。」⑤

在這種執行羣衆路線過程中，於「宣傳解釋」時，對於與執行着的相對方面的路線必須批評，以示其所執行着的路線正確，樹立起路線權威。樹立路線權威則又與樹立領導這條路線的權威分不開的。從中國共產黨的革命歷史來說，於一九三五年毛澤東為中共中央委員會主席時，其個人的革命權威未曾建立，經過多次路線鬥爭，到一九四五年的第七次全國黨代表大會，一方面作出「關於若干歷史問題的決議」，批判在此以前的與毛澤東相對立的路線，同時正式提出毛澤東思想這個詞彙，說明以之來指導中國共產黨的革命。從那時起，中國共產黨將革命權威落實到毛澤東個人頭上；亦從那時起，若干路線鬥爭中，憑藉其個人權威壓服反對之者的多數，成為全黨的路線。使中國共產黨領導的無產階級專政，實際變成了個人專政，所謂民主集中制，也只有集中而無民主。最後，要求人們背誦他的語錄，強調他的說話，「水平最高，威力最大，句句是真理，一句頂一萬句。」⑥他的革命權威再次升級，達到神化的程度，有被視之為天命的傾向。

在一九四五年以前，樹立毛澤東的革命權威，看來是他自己的需要。後來的神化，則是其所反對的。憑其權威壓服多數而實行的路線，從革命立場來說，也不能說全部都是錯誤的。但是，他並不能阻止其向神化方面發展。主觀上的原因，是要遂行其繼續革命實現共產主義願望；要繼續維持其革命權威。客

觀的原因，則是大部分幹部與人民仍然習慣於封建專政的傳統；下節所述最近兩年所公開暴露出來的幹部，人民的封建思想足以支持這個論點。

關於後一個原因，毛澤東也不是不知道，由他主持的中共中央政治局會議對於斯大林個人崇拜評論的文章，就指出個人崇拜是舊社會的思想殘餘，並引列寧的話：「千百萬人的習慣勢力是最可怕的勢力。」來警惕全黨。⑦可惜他後來並未認真設法阻過革命權威與封建專政聯系起來的傾向。

（三）思想改造與體治

毛澤東所倡導的思想改造，其哲學基礎是唯物的認識論「實踐——理論——實踐」這個公式。上節所述羣衆路線，就是由羣衆的實踐中來，總結出理論，再到羣衆中去實踐，是故說這種領導方法是基於「馬克思主義的認識論」。這裡所說的理論，包括世界觀，思想以至計劃、方案等等一切精神範圍的東西，從實踐而來修改理論，是對領導者的思想改造。而將這種理論通過「宣傳解釋，代為羣衆的意見」則是對羣衆的思想改造。如果將思想改造局限於理解為勞動改造是錯誤的，而是從上到下包括毛澤東自己在內全中國人都要思想改造。⑧

思想改造的基本要求，是要人們具有階級意識，進行階級鬥爭，實現共產主義；其基本方法則是實踐。從其要求與方法來說，當然與體治並不相同。但若從每個人的思想認識這方面着手，和維持無產階級專政這個目的而言，則亦有共同之處，即均以道德規範個人行為為基礎來達到領導者所希求的目的。因此，自稱為最先進的做法，可能就是中國原有的封建做法而不自知。

前已說過，共產黨的革命根據社會發展規律，而現實社會非常複雜，變化萬端，必須認真研究觀察。強調：「為了不至於落後，就必須經常不斷地注意形勢的每一細小變化。每個革命者都應當具有敏銳的政治眼光，有對新鮮事物的敏感，善於觀察形勢。」⑨可惜這種形勢的觀察極不容易，而且又攝於毛澤東的革命權威，於是觀察形勢變成了觀察毛澤東的「風向」，變成了封建的「事上」。

這種「事上」，並不單只在觀察形勢方面，而且普遍的擴及下級對上級的奉迎。一篇對於周恩來如何阻止其侄女仗勢安排工作的報導，⑩曾經多處刊登。從正面看，確實說明周氏的無私，不搞特殊；但從反面看，却暴露下級對上級的如何奉迎。

周的侄女秉建，一九六八年下放到內蒙阿巴嘎旗伊和高勒公社新寶力格生產隊。一九七〇年征兵，周秉建應征，批准入伍。次年，到京見周，周要她脫下軍服回草原；並說：雖合手續，但內蒙這麼多人裡偏挑上了你，還不是看我的面子！⑪周秉建回部隊申請回草原。部隊領導不批，以為拖幾個月，周不再過問。但又被周知道，堅決要周秉建回草原。這次周秉建換到西烏珠穆沁旗吉林格勒公社阿拉坦圖生產隊，到達之時，牧民們站隊歡迎。周秉建看牧牲畜，黨支部書記怕凍壞她，以自己的腰圍纏在她的臉上。一九七五年，內蒙古自治區黨委決定抽周秉建到共青團區委會工作。周秉建回京見周，要求繼續留在基層，並申述其學習蒙古語的願望。周同意。周秉建再回草原，向內蒙古自治區領導說了自己的想法。稍後，公社黨委，生產隊黨支部、貧下中牧協會聯名寫信

給自治區黨委，要求將周秉建留在基層。同年冬，周秉建入內蒙古大學蒙古語專業學習。一九七八年秋畢業，回草原。十月，被選為代表，參加共青團第十次全國代表大會。回蒙後，任烏珠穆沁旗團委書記。

幹部們對一般人民是不是也像對周秉建那樣的呢？絕對不是。要他們「窮過渡」，於是要求農民忍飢挨餓，砍掉自留樹，殺掉家畜……割掉「資本主義尾巴」，由生產隊為核算單位過渡到以生產大隊為核算單位；這種過渡被視為向共產主義前進一步。就不就是「餓死事極小，失節事極大」的做法，似乎比董仲舒所說的「易治」更進一步。

現在，大陸國營商店的秤、磅計重器，都不準確，重值偏小。北京市每年升溢的糧票在幾十萬斤以上。⑨這也就是說，北京市的國營糧店每年剋扣的糧食有幾十萬斤？……這種情況說之不盡。城市居民生活雖比農村較高，但亦受到不公平的待遇。

城市居民住房緊張，機關有幹部宿舍，這且不說，黨委有特別的「常委樓、書記院」；⑩城市居民購物要排隊，機關有集團購買，集團購買力年年壓縮，却年年增長，這且不說，羣眾買不到的奇缺商品，特權階層三份、五份的買。⑪城市居民小孩托兒所、幼兒園奇缺，而機關的托兒所，幼兒園卻經常空置。連電影院，體育場館的情況也是如此。這種情況不禁使人想起清朝滿人在各城市的統治特區。

現在農民要遷入城市，即使是偏僻小縣城也非常困難，除非通過有力幹部「走後門」。而城市工廠招工則實行着子女頂替的辦法。前者是全國性的違反憲法居住自由的行政措施，後者則是國務院勞動總局的規定。這似乎恢復了商周時代的「農之子恒農，工之子恒工，商之子恒商」⑫的制度。中國共產黨這幾年來一直在批評「血統論」，却想不到倡導之者正是它自己。

可悲的正在於此，批判封建而卻做封建的事而不自知。以前，我只認為官僚主義嚴重，現在看來，這種官僚主義的思想基礎卻是封建，這種封建思想不僅未遭阻遏而且還在繼續發展。

北京民主牆是在這種背景下出現的。

註釋：

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②尚書，「多方篇」。

③尚書，「用書」篇。

④後漢書，「皇甫嵩傳」。

⑤論語，「顏淵篇」。

⑥孟子，「滕文公篇」，尚書，「泰誓篇」，「狎侮五常」疏。

⑦董仲舒，春秋繁露，「基義」篇。

⑧全上，「順命篇」。男奴叫臣，女奴叫妾。

⑨論語，「憲問篇」。

⑩荀子，「修身」篇。

⑪論語，「顏淵篇」。

⑫孟子，「盡心」上篇。

⑬朱熹，朱子語類、十三篇。

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⑮尚書，「周書」篇。

⑯呂維祺，孝經或問。

⑰二程遺書，卷二十二下。

⑱辭海（一九四八版），上海，中華書局，P.256。

⑲辭海（一九七九版），上海辭書社，P.3424。

⑳禮記，「大學」篇。

㉑論語，「子張篇」。

㉒朱熹，晦庵文集，卷三十九。

㉓孟子，「盡心」篇。

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㉕韓愈，韓昌黎全集，「原道」篇。

㉖董仲舒，春秋繁露，基義篇；漢書，「董仲舒傳」。

㉗董仲舒，春秋繁露，「度制」篇。

㉘康熙，「朱子全書」序。

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㉚列寧全集，第三十二卷，北京，人民出版社，P.505。

㉛毛澤東，「關於正確處理人民內部矛盾的問題」，毛澤東著作選讀，（甲種本），P.351。

㉜毛澤東，「關於領導方法的若干問題」，毛澤東選集，P.901。

㉝一九七九年十二月廿五日人民日報。

㉞「關於無產階級專政的歷史經驗」，一九五六年四月五日人民日報。

㉟請參閱，毛澤東思想、內容與形式，「改造主觀世界」一節，P.69—71。

㊱一九五九年六月廿四日人民日報。

㊲一九七九年三月五日人民日報。

㊳當兵，在國內是一樁為人期望的事情。待遇較高，退任轉業，可能由農村轉入城市工作。

㊴一九七九年十一月十六日人民日報。

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民主是什麼？

民主是什麼及實行民主是否適合，這原是兩個不同的問題。前者是要為民主找尋一個定義，它的答案應該是絕對肯定的，因為沒有共同的語意，人們也就沒有談論民主是好是壞的可能，而這個問題的答案，卻不像「民主是什麼」那般肯定，因為它包含了人的價值判斷，而且，在不同的經濟制度及文化的社會裏，實行民主的結果，也不可能完全一樣。

民主是什麼？要解答這個問題，我們就必須從歷史中追溯它原本的意義。民主（Democracy）源於希臘文 Domokrata 一詞，意思就是由人民統治。事實上，民主制度也是首先在希臘發展，並且於公元前六至四世紀期間，在城邦雅典趨於成熟。當時希臘的人口還很小，社會以城市為單位，政府的官員都是民衆選出來的，市區中心有一個大廣場，政府有什麼事情宣佈，或要作什麼決定，都在這廣場實行，市民不單可以知道國家大事，還能夠藉大會表示個人意見，參與決定。不過，當時除了參與政治決策的權力之外，更重要的是，雅典人對政治問題的討論有著無比的熱情，因此，雅典不僅在形式上實行了民主，也真正達到了民主的精神。

總括來說，民主就是在政治問題的決策上，取得大部份人民的同意。但要實現民主，必須要符合兩個條件：（一）人民必須要有參與政治決策的權力，

同時，這個權力必須制度化，即確立一個民主制度；（二）人民真正地運用他們參與決策的權力。

民主制度可說是民主的基礎，它雖不能保證人民真正去運用其決策權，但沒有民主政制，卻無論如何不能夠確立民主。那麼，什麼才是民主制度呢？雅典般的公開政治討論及決議無疑為一民主制度理想的模式，但近代國家領土的擴大，人口的增加，以及其它種種技術上的困難，令到雅典式的民主制無法再實行，因此，民主政制必須以另一種新形態出現，多黨選舉制正是向這方面發展的。

多黨選舉制首先在西方資本主義社會出現，這並不是一件偶然的事，而是因為它是包含著資本主義社會所提倡的自由競爭精神的。在這個制度之下，每個人民都可以自由地選擇他們所擁護的候選人，而每個候選人也自由地角逐執政的地位。人民參與政治決策的權力只限下選舉時的投票權，而其它的權力就交給了被選出來的人民代表。

從表面上看來，由於被選出來的代表未必能真正代表人民的意向，所以這個制度可能不會完成民主的目標。但另一方面，執政黨任期的限制，卻迫使執政者不得不去迎合羣衆的意思，以繼續獲得他們的支持，因此，這個制度基本上已達到了「人民同意」的統治這個精神，可說是民主的；至少，一個不獲人民支持的執政黨無法長期繼續下去，使專政的局面得以避免出現。

人們對民主這個概念的混淆，主要是把民主是什麼及民主政制是否適合這個不同問題混為一談。當物質文明及自由的生活方式成為現代西方資本主義社會的標記時，人們不僅認為民主政制可能是一種理想制度，而更錯誤的將民主制度本身當作一套理想的政治制度，它是符合人民利益的。在共產主義思想出現之前，這個錯誤並沒有帶來太大的紛亂，但當共產主義信徒指出資本主義社會的階級性時，不僅資本主義社會的經濟制度成為批判的對象，就是資本主義社會制度也受到攻擊，認為它不能達到真正的民主。

共產主義信徒認為在資產階級的社會裏，由人民選出來的執政者未必能代表人民的真正利益，他們只代表了資本家的利益。只有當資本主義社會滅亡及階級消除之後，整個社會人民的利益才會是一致的，也唯有在共產主義社會下，才能有真正的民主。

他們對資本主義社會的民主制度所作的指控可能是正確的，但這個指控卻不能成為否定資本主義社會的選舉制為一民主制度的理由。

民主制度與資本主義是不相容的嗎？馬克思曾經指出，人們所能感覺到的只是一個失真的世界。當資本家支付了勞資雙方協議下所規定的工資時，工人就覺得他們出賣的勞動已被完全補償了，他們毫不醒覺自己的剩餘價值被剝削掉，他們對於資產階級對他們的剝削是不自覺的接受了。所以，即使資本主義社會的人民代表不能代表人民真正的利益，但他們的執政卻仍然可以是獲得羣衆同意的。

另一方面，很多人雖然不支持共產主義者的看法，但他們對民主的看法與前者卻有同一般的誤解，雙方都把民主作為一種理想政治制度，只不過前者是

否定了資產階級社會下的民主制是可保障人民利益的這個功能，而後者卻肯定了這個制度的價值的。他們論及民主時，總會將自由、平等這些概念加在民主的特質裏面，但事實上，人民對自由及平等的追求，是由人們當時的意識形態所決定的，而人們的意識形態卻受制於他們所生活的那一個特定的經濟制度及社會文化。政治制度和自由、平等是沒有一定的關係的。

討論民主是什麼可能及不上談論民主是否適合那般有意義，但假如民主的概念未能統一，那就沒有談論民主是否適合的條件。民主制度雖然是在資產階級社會出現，但社會主義國家就未必不能實現同樣的民主制度。不過，假如我們要把民主制作為一種代表人民真正利益的政治制度，那我們現在就決不可能有一個統一的民主概念了。

民主—— 意識形態的革命

引言

本文是想用馬克思主義角度，從哲學批判開始分析，通過兩個馬克思主義的中心概念——疏離（主體與客體的分割）和實踐（人與外在世界的介體，使主體與客體關係得以建立），重新檢討民主的應有地位及其作用，而這是直接關係到我們的實踐，關係到我們對社會主義理論的實際應用。

民主被提出應作為一個在不斷鬥爭中發展的理念，一種向上發展中的人類自我價值追求運動。民主本身既可為一政治制度，而更重要的則是一種意識形態（思維的最高表現），通過本身的政治制度人類有意識地實踐，它對社會有着不可忽視的角色。雖然承認民主是階級社會的歷史產物，及在理論上民主隨著國家消滅而消失，但反對民主在國家未消滅前的不應存在。

四點預先的基本立據

（一）馬克思主義是一個整體（Totality Complex）的思想，要對其後期著作中，特別是政治經濟的批判的認識，就必須要連結馬克思的早期作品一起研究，特別是對馬克思的哲學基礎探討，才可以了解的。

(二)在承認經濟基礎的「決定性」作用上，意識形態是經濟基礎和上層建築的統一表現。意識形態的發展，不但反映着經濟基礎的發展，而且還受到政治的制約，從屬於政治。但是，在這決定性的關係之中，我們更要理解的，是它們三者之間有着其相當的相對自主性。(如列寧對國家性質的批判，是要從政治相對自主性這個概念去理解。)

而更重要的是，意識形態在三者中，有着最高的相對自主性(如格蘭西(A. Gramsci)對超結構的能動性分析及阿塞爾(L. Althusser)的意識形態國家工具(Ideology State apparatus)的分析可顯示)。因此，意識形態在馬克思主義社會分析的模式中是一個最基本的自由變項(free Parameter)，它在矛盾中發展着的社會便成爲一個最佳的緩和工具。如格蘭西所指出，由於社會的控制文化(Societal Control Culture)的確立，造成被統治者對現有政制在意識上的同意，故即使有經濟危機的出現——社會矛盾深化的顯像，現有生產關係及至社會秩序亦可以得以繼續維持。

因此，意識形態的鬥爭更往往表現為主導因素，而對社會發展是必然的推動催化劑。所以在適當的轉化條件下，意識形態的物質化，經過羣衆掌握，通過實質的政治行動及革命實踐，就可能產生社會革命(生產關係的改變)。

這個自由變項(意識形態)的被固定化或消失，會產生以下兩種結果：(一)社會原有的內在矛盾顯現出來及被強化，以至革命的需要性及其目標得被認識；(二)社會的假象及疏離程度的減少，人與人(特別指被統治的階層)之間的關係的重整，打破了被單子化(atomization)的局面，產生一個力的社會組合——一股潛在的革命力。

(三)馬克思對資本主義社會的批判層面，簡單地可還原到政治經濟的批判，亦即對私有制的生產關係所帶來的人與人、人與社會及人與自然的關係的批判。而列寧更強烈化了對政治本身的批判，亦即對國家與社會的分離及國家本質的批判。

但在肯定本文第一點的立據上，我們是應將這決定性的批判層面更深化至意識形態，以突出馬克思思想中，本來批判的目的(哲學層面的批判)及其根源性的批判(政治經濟的批評)二者的有機關係。

(四)在承認階級的存在一日，階級鬥爭是必然在進行中，而意識形態的鬥爭也將隨着階級鬥爭的深化而日漸激化，故政治理論的爭辯的激化也是必然的相應後果。而一方面爲了宣傳及行動性的作用，另一方面亦不能排除思維在歷史社會中的依賴性和局限性，及理論家的主觀性和身處的階級性；理論的提出也會傾向強烈化(impact creating)和手段化(strategical)，如馬克思主義有被誤爲機械的經濟決定論。由於這種原因，意識形態的鬥爭，往往在不知不覺中，將一些新的假象來取代部分舊的，已被揭露的假象。故此意識形態的鬥爭，在社會改革後一定要，並且會存在，以對付舊的、未被揭露的及新產生的假象，但這種關係的發展是螺旋式的前進上升運動。

自由王國——自由的新意

馬克思主義的理想——共產社會——亦被稱爲自由王國，究竟是甚麼原因？這裏便要引入馬克思對社會的哲學批判。

馬克思認爲人與動物的分別，在於人生來就是一種有意識的種族存在(Species Being)，人把他的生活活動變成他的意志與意識的對象。由於人是社會的人，人性便不是一個抽象的概念，而必須透過社會關係來講人(如資本主義下，人對金錢和物慾的高度崇尚只是歷史社會產物)。但是在肯定社會對人的影響外，馬克思亦強調人的有意識的主觀能動性，這亦即是人的實踐活動。人通過生產活動，使人與自然、人與社會發生關係，一方面改變了自然，同時也改變了自己。這亦即是說人不是抽象的、被動的，人通過實踐是積極的、主動的實體。

實踐可說是馬克思主義中一個核心的分析概念。人類通過實踐(其形成也包括人對客觀規律的理論知識的掌握)，不但維持他自身的生存、改變自然，而且更重要的是發揮了人的潛能，肯定自己和實現了人的社會本質。

但是人既是社會的人，人要以一定方式來共同活動和進行互相互換，這便產生社會的生產關係。由於交換勞動關係的形成，人自身作爲一種自然力與自然物質相對立的關係，便部分轉移到人與人之間。人與人之間原應具有的一種精神和物質相結合的創造性關係，便不能自由發揮；甚至還變爲一種敵對的關係；是以，人不再是自由人了。由此便走進另一個馬克思的核心批判概念——「疏離」。

疏離的意思，就是人自己原有的投射出外的東西反過來奴役人，對疏離的批判的目的，在於使人類重新返回人類最初不疏離的境界——真正的自由人。在馬克思的早期作品中，如哲學——經濟學手稿(一八四四年)中，是用「疏離」的概念來批判資本主義；他詳細地分析了生產過程如何使人失去自己的本質，成爲疏離的勞動。在私有制下，由於生產者與生產工具的分離及僱用勞動制的成立，人與勞動產品及生產活動、人與人甚至人與他自己也疏離化了。但馬克思認爲疏離不過是特定的歷史社會組織形態下的產物，要消滅疏離化的勞動，就必須消除私有制，亦即實行共產主義，提供一個解放人的真正自由的環境，使「一般的人性」能完全發展。因此，資本主義的自由革命，是完全不同於社會主義的自由革命。

對民主的正面批判

馬克思主義進一步在對社會的實質批判，便是政治的批判，亦即是社會的階級性(人與人之間疏離的一種產物)，而引至對國家本質問題的分析。國家是階級統治的工具，是掌握在剝削階級手中的一整套有組織的暴力機構，它代表着社會的陷入了不可解決的自我矛盾，分裂爲不可調和的對立面。國家正是一種與社會脫離的力量(國家可說是人和社會的疏離化的產物)，以緩和矛盾

。國家通過兩種國家機器以發揮對現存社會制度的鞏固性職能：（一）壓迫性國家機器——如軍警、法律和監獄；（二）意識形態國家機器——如宗教、教育、家庭及大眾傳播媒介等。前者主要通過暴力而有着最後的決定作用；後者則表現為最主導的作用，因為後者的活動範圍主要是私人範疇（Private Domain），而甚至經過內化的過程（Internalization）滲透入個體的意識裏。

因着意識形態國家機器的主導作用，社會便充滿假象和假意識（對實在存在環境的疏離表象）；一方面使人忘記了人的自我本質，另一方面又掩飾了國家階級性的本質。特別在資本主義社會中，政治是能在決定性的經濟基礎下表面獨立出來，經過直接生產者與生產資料的分離及自由勞工市場，形成階級關係的非政治化、和統治階級的無名化的假象，加上「經濟自由」，「政治平等」的假個人意識，使到政權得以合法化。在此，馬克思主義正深深地批判了資本主義下的民主。「自由、平等、博愛」——民主的間接提出，便是一個階級性的革命口號，而到民主既以一種政體及意識形態的形式存在，更被批判為一種假象及假意識。（因為民主既然是一種政府、一種政權組織的形式，它不但不能改變，並且更進而掩蓋着國家階級統治的性質。）

以上的篇幅，是想引出馬克思主義對資本主義的主要否定是勞動的疏離，而這否定的否定將隨着割離的勞動的消失而來臨，疏離問題的揭示便只有經過對假象及假意識的批判，這看出意識形態的批判，在馬克思主義下是非常重要的。然而，這是不能通過「思維」的本身來解決，他一定要經過實質的革命實踐，去奪得政權及改變經濟制度。但意識形態的批判卻是必須的，這是一種辯證關係的分析。雖然民主在一個歷史社會裏，是會表現為假象；但以民主作為人類自我價值的追求運動，民主便是一種有意識的實踐，這種實踐是會幫助重建分割了的主體與客體關係。另一方面，民主既是一種有意識的實踐，亦可為一個假象或假意識的理念，正正反映出普遍性的矛盾存在於思維。民主這個概念的矛盾，便是客觀矛盾的反映，而民主運動的發展，正是由這個矛盾所推動（注意的是民主運動的發展，仍然從屬於歷史社會的發展）。客觀社會矛盾的消滅，便代表着國家的消滅，民主的消滅。

在承認社會主義裏階級的還未消滅，社會主義裏的民主，亦只是一個新的假象及假意識，但這時候的民主，是代表着更高形態的意識形態的鬥爭（即使民主旗幟在資本革命中的高舉，是在於反對封建地主的統治，這種反封建性卻不減其在社會歷史上所起着的積極意義。）

民主價值的一種估量

我們可以發覺馬克思主義是肯定了人性的完美。但由於人受著歷史社會環境的影響，人性便被不完美的社會所歪曲，因此我們一定要改革那不完美社會而再次將人解放。由此，社會主義便背負了幾個重大的責任，不單是提高生產力，更重要的是製造一個解放人類自由的環境，追尋及了解人類天生的能力，並將它們儘量發揮出來。

但是，社會主義亦避免及不可能明確地建立一個在不同歷史社會中的人性概念，而集中於組織制度的改革，如生產資料的社會化，建立一個認為可以培養人類本身去塑造自己的環境。這裏產生三個重要的問題：第一、人類究竟有多大的程度去製造自己，如馬古沙（H. Marcuse）所提出的關於人類內在精神心理因素的限制的問題，由於能力問題，在此不會繼續討論；第二，甚麼的組織制度才算是適當？如生產資料的社會化亦可只是一種經濟的表現，由於政治與意識形態的相對自主性，我們亦應注意到權力社會化及無產階級自我意識的認同的實在條件等問題；第三，由於社會主義對人的行為理論不肯定（在資本主義社會裏，人是被認為是好佔有的（acquisitive）及競爭性的動物，因此物質鼓勵是非常重要的。）。因此，它不能檢討出物質鼓勵以外其他鼓勵方式的性質及結果；另一方面，又不能成功地將每一個人連結入（integrated）社會的整體內，以發揮社會主義社會的集體創造力量。

在此，參予性的民主在社會主義社會裏的重要性便得到確立。民主既可為一政治組織制度及為一種意識形態，它一方面提供了一種形式去連結社會的個體，及為社會化的經濟基礎創造着行政組織的基礎，而又可從實踐中沖擊社會主義裏特權化的官僚階層的社會基礎；另一方面，它培養着人民的自我意識，從實際體會出個體與個體的實在合作關係，進而更加深對自我的認同，擴大人民的解放意識。

我們是要肯定的是所有的社會革命，應代表着羣衆有意識地對理想社會的追尋運動的提昇。民主運動的發展，正表示出一種自發性的革命實踐，而可以促進社會發展。社會革命的去向，決不是盲目的機械必然性的結果。

結語

我們是要將民主從新放回經濟基礎、政治制度及意識形態三者之間的相對自主性的微妙關係中，剖析民主與社會發展的密切關係。由於政治制度的自主性，民主運動的發展便提供了一個有高度整合的組織制度；而在意識形態方面，則可建立一個有自我意識的社會整體，幫助過渡社會的發展。

社會革命主要有兩個意義，它代表着人與自然及人與人之間關係的重建。民主不但可直接幫助後者成長——人的自我意識的認同，而亦可間接扶助前者的發展——提供社會組織基礎及提高人合作生產的積極性。

總括來說，民主既是一個包括着主觀實踐的理念，雖然它是受着歷史社會存在的環境所制約，民主為假象的產生，便是反映着客觀規律的限制，民主的發展及轉化更是代表着人類的不斷解放。

大眾傳播媒介 與 中國民主問題

一個民主政治組織運行的暢順，有相當的程度是決定於統治階層對人民的了解。當然，最理想的情況就是直接接觸，互相交流。但這方法在接近十億人民的中國，實際上是沒有可能施行的。另一種提法就是「由下而上」的民主集中制^①，但往往因為官僚層的阻隔，經官僚代表，呈交中央的資料的準確程度及時間都有所偏差。故此，大眾傳播媒介在反映民意這方面的功能，對整個民主政制，便顯得有重大的意義。

在討論大眾傳播媒介民主關係前，我們先要理解社會主義民主的基本概念：

社會主義民主是一種大部份人的民主（Majority Democracy），因為大部份人民是屬於無產階級，完成無產階級民主就是完成社會主義民主。為了無產階級的利益，在社會主義過渡時期，要實行無產階級專政——就是無產階級專資產階級的政。而資本主義社會的議會民主，參與民主等等，是假民主。因為本質上，這些仍是少數資產階級壓迫多數無產階級的「民主」，是資產階級的民主。所以，在階級仍然存在的時候，社會主義民主是最好民主的形式。在現階段實際運行上，因為國內人民的普遍意識，仍然需要一些意識較高的階層領導，先鋒黨（國內即共產黨）便負責起這個領導責任。黨在實際工作上，針對無產階級利益，施行政治上，經濟上，社會上的一切基本決策，是一種「由下

而上」的民主集中制。

那麼，大眾傳播媒介在國內又反映了多少「由下而上」的意見及提法呢？國內認為：

在階級分化的社會中，現代大眾傳播媒介本質上是意識形態^②國家機器^③，為一定特殊階級服務。在資本主義社會，隨着生產力^④的發展，科技的進步，資本密集^⑤成為企業的特色。大眾傳播媒介亦給資產階級所壟斷。當然，資產階級會傳播有利維持現存制度的意識形態。缺乏資本，勞動人民不能夠擁有大眾傳播媒介企業。企業永遠為資產階級服務：大眾傳播媒介在現存階級分化的時代，為一特定階級服務是無可避免的。在社會主義國家，勞動人民重新擁有大眾傳播媒介企業，黨作為人民的先鋒，當以保護無產階級利益為原則，禁止一切破壞無產階級利益的公開言論，盡量反映勞動人民的意願，使大眾傳播媒介成為促成社會主義民主的有效工具。

所有不同形式的民主思潮，背後都有自己一套理想，基本上作者不反對任何一種提法，但肯定每一個人都有基本的自然權力^⑥（Natural Right）。這種權力的存在，是先於所有理想，所有「民主」形式，所有主義。它是不從屬於任何外在事物。因為它是人類內在天生擁有，它不應該受到任何羣體理想，政制，及法律的限制。當然，在認定或分別自然與非自然權力時，是有着一定的爭論。但如果我們同意自由地表達有客觀事實支持的自我意見，是自然權力的一種，我們便一定不能夠接受單由一特殊階級——先鋒黨^⑦——所理解，而決定某言論是否合乎客觀事實，這意見的自由表達是否屬於自然權力，從而決定某言論可否通過大眾傳播媒介公開。中華民族需要的，是相對地客觀而實際上較接近政治獨立的法律——新聞法——在這制度上分別是非。

在從一個較實際的角度分析，以國內報業為例，重點在於單元化的意識形態教育，絕少有其他與黨有較大偏差的提法。這種現象的出現，有兩個可能的解釋：第一個可能性就是，所有階級都有相同的意識形態，如果屬實，黨亦無需繼續控制或干預大眾傳播媒介的運行。但從黨仍然維持相當大程度的控制來看，我們可以認定，這個可能性不可能成立。於是，只餘下一個可能，就是不同思潮是客觀存在及可能會要求表達，但黨以破壞無產階級利益為理由，不給予刊登，於是問題便轉回到文中自然權力的討論。

在從一個較功效性的角度分析，建國初期，社會局勢動蕩，對大眾傳播媒介實行較大程度的控制，是可以諒解的。但「四人幫」垮台後，政治局面已相對地穩定，如果言論控制仍然維持「文革」時期的手段，人民不能通過大眾傳播媒介反映個人意願，而政策的實行只建基於黨對人民「一廂情願」的期望，社會主義或任何形式的民主也永遠不能完成。

不論任何形式的社會制度，都不能抑壓人的自然權力，它的存在是神所賜予，先世界所有制度的存在。再講，任何社羣的形成及存在，都是為每個個體的福利作打算，我們不能以任何羣體利益為藉口，禁制有客觀事實所支持的個人言論（自然權力的一部份），通過大眾傳播媒介，得以上呈統治階層。過去，國內大眾傳播媒介在「泛政治化」^⑧的原則下運行，人民的政治意識相應地提高，正好給與人民「民主」一個良好的基礎，我們期望「真正」的「民主」會降臨在中國人民身上。

備註：

一、民主集中制(Dictatorships of Democracy)民主集中制的概念是起源於馬克思主義的唯物認識論。毛澤東將認識論落實為實踐——理論——實踐的羣衆路線政治領導方法，以改造客觀世界，建設社會主義的過渡社會。它的內容是將分散的羣衆意見集中，又到羣衆中去作宣傳解釋，化爲羣衆的意見，使羣衆堅持下去，見之行動，並在羣衆中考驗它是否正確。然後，再從羣衆中集中起來，再到羣衆中去……。但必須要注意的是，民主集中並不是西方的民主加上集中，它應是革命的手段而並不是目的，而另一方面，集中是在民主基礎上的集中，沒有民主就沒有集中，集中便變成集權。

二、意識形態(Ideology)

社會學家認爲，人類行爲有相當大的程度，是受外在環境事物影響（甚至乎支配），他們面對世界的態度，日常的行爲，個人的價值觀，都有一定模式，稱爲意識形態。

三、國家機器(State Apparatus)

馬克思主義理論家認爲，國家爲了維持存在的制度，建立了不同形式的機構，去抑壓人民的反動。

四、生產力(Force of Production)

在一社會系統，人類僱用不同形式的特殊非人類生產工具從事生產。而生產力就是指一切人類與非人類生產工具的關係，亦是表示人類在生產中對自然界的關係。

五、資本密集(Capital Intensive)

資本與勞動力處於相對大的比例，以增加勞動的生產力。

六、自然權力(Natural Right)

是古希臘時代，羅馬帝國法律學家Cicero 所提出的概念。但要對這概念的掌握，我們需要以它作爲一個自然的、個體的、及絕對的概念，和它作爲一個社會的、集體的、及相對的概念之間，找尋自我價值平衡點。

七、補充

在無產階級專政的過渡社會期間，既然國家和國家機關有從社會公僕變成社會主宰的實際危險，那末集中一切國家權力的黨（列寧所提出的先鋒黨），當然也不能完全免除這種可能性。

八、泛政治化

毛澤東執政以來，很強調政治先於一切，所以每一事物的運行，都應有其政治功能，是謂「泛政治化」。

政府政治 與 民意途徑

香港，是中國領土的一部份，亦是英國的托管地，這一小片土地上存在着各方面的利益和興趣，這包括英國，中國及香港市民。雖然這許多的利害關係中，難免存在着矛盾，存在着衝突，但是，各方最大的利益存在於一個和平共存的局面，而政府的主要工作，亦是以安定繁榮香港爲主。

香港對英國的貢獻是無形的收入。英國資本的大企業得到了各種方便，而它們亦有穩固的基礎，所以在香港的經濟結構中，有着重要的地位，他們更利用香港作爲遠東基地，把業務伸展至東南亞及中國各地，英國貨物在港亦得到了良好的市場，及低稅的便利，香港本身亦是英國及中國交易的一個良好基地及陳列處，此外還有很多其他較次利益。香港對英國是有貢獻的，英國亦不需在經濟或政治上爲香港而付出代價，故此經歷了幾次暴動，及日本的侵佔，英國還未有放棄香港的意圖。英國對香港的內政缺少直接的影響，它避免，也沒有需要干擾香港內務，只要香港的政治及經濟情況仍然對它有利，它是沒有需要放棄香港的。

中國從香港獲得的收益，可在其佔全國外匯收入的百分比而顯出其重要性。中國以香港進步的交通，作為其貨物轉口站，及旅遊中途站，利用香港優良的政治，地理及經濟環境，與其他國家進行交易，從香港學習先進科技及貿易方法，透過香港吸收其他國家的文化，對港輸出貨物及吸收港人的匯款。事實上，香港是一個華人社會，和中國有密切連繫，若中國要全力發展經濟，在現階段，香港的協助是難於缺少的，亦難於找到其他更佳替代途徑。中國極希望保持香港的政治現況，對香港的內政甚少干擾，亦少透過間接的媒介反對現行的政治政策。

香港本身是一個資本主義社會，有動力而對政治缺少興趣的勞工，良好的管理及技術人材，地理環境優越，交通發達，工商業基礎穩固，稅率偏低，在政治穩定及政府鼓勵工商業發展的有利情況下，使一個缺乏資源的地方成為一個繁榮的城市。這一個社會講求公平競爭，增進個人財富，很多事物均以金錢連繫及以之作為度量，強調個人，鼓吹享樂及消費。由於財富的分佈不平均，資本集中於一小部分人手中，使市民分成兩個不同的經濟階層。在香港，擁有較大數目的資本能夠較易累積資金，故此不但資金集中於大企業家手中，經濟活動也集中於大企業，這些大企業無論在橫度或縱度均十分擴展，一個企業往往包括了很多大公司，各個大公司又在其行業中舉足輕重，由於很多時一個集團常擁有其他集團公司的股份，或在人事上有聯繫，使得情況更為複雜，小資本公司往往要依附大公司而生存，或在較不重要的行業發展。本港商業集團，以英資公司勢力為最，不過華資公司亦不弱，而且一部分華資公司的發展迅速，使他們未來在港的地位，更形重要，由於華人企業家有部份和其他地區有生意來往，而很多又被認為是市民的代表人物，故此對政府事務，有一些影響力。由於香港的政治在很大程度上往往關連到經濟，故此這些企業家對政治亦有影響力，不過他們對政治的意見往往是希望能安定香港，能夠在有利的政治經濟環境下發展業務。

香港市民普遍生活水平不低，繁榮的社會使他們從中得到好處，普遍來說，他們無論在學習或工作上都很勤力，以求目前或將來有較大的金錢收益，亦很注重消費，提高本身的物質享受，但是生活卻往往因而變成集體化，商品化及單一化，他們對政治的看法也是以安定繁榮的社會為主，個人能從中得到物質上的利益，由於生活緊張及過份關注個人問題，對於政治活動較少參與或關心，但在與本身有直接利害關係的事情上，卻很注重。

在結構上，政府的本港最高首長是港督，由英國派任，要向英國國會負責，在行使內政方面，他有很大的權力，立法局的決議要經他批准，於行政，司法及軍事方面亦有最高決策權。英國很少影響香港的行政，以防引起政治不安定及外國的反感，實行上亦有技術性上的困難，故此港督及由他所領導的高級官員很能依照各種情況而制定各種政策。在港督之下有立法局，行政局，市政局，布政司署及廉政公署，在各種事務上他們是最高的機構，行政局及立法局

由政府官員及委任之市民組成，市政局則有委任議員及民選議員，但市政局的職權範圍甚少，只限於維持城市的正常運行事務及推動文康活動，民選議員也只佔總人數的一半，布政司署則是施政中心，其下再分各科，他們以工作性質而劃分，中下層政府的職權甚受限制，工作範圍有清楚的界定，中下層往往可以不作任何重要決定而將事件提交上層，但是由於制度的不完善及政府的龐大各層政府部門的交通及同層政府部門的交通效率不高，速度及表達能力不甚滿意，為了較有效的推行各種政策及作有效的回應，行政權力則有分區化及部分權力下放的傾向。中下層的職位多由本港人士担任，而上層亦有本港人士，而且有繼續增加的傾向，但在非常重要的位置上，還是由外國人所出任，而政府亦能影響各階層人員的任用及升調。值得一提的是香港的警察隊伍，是人數最多的一個部隊，他們裝配先進，制度嚴密，有着特殊的地位，政府十分倚重他們維持治安及安定香港，並力求提升其質素，力求加強紀律，以便有效的運用這支部隊，不過政府亦同時倚重駐港英軍作為對內穩定香港的一個決心和力量。

政府的決策權力集中在高層，他們依情況而訂定各種政策，而政府的權力亦十分大，能夠對各種社會事務加以影響，他們的決定，往往首先察聽及考慮各方面的意見，力求增進各方面的利益，安定繁榮香港社會，對於意見的傳達十分重視，力求清楚了解情況。不過很多時政策往往難以平衡各方面的興趣，故此會依情況而作出優先的選擇。由於中下層政府未能提高效率，政府亦面臨制定政策後如何有效地推行的難題。

政府政策中，對於經濟是採用自由放任政策，只對工商業作間接的幫助，如訓練專業人材，設立各種工商業機構等。在社會建設方面則較注重，如建造公路，製訂城市發展計劃，開發郊區等均使用大量金錢，在普通支出項目如行政，法律，防衛等為普通程度，在社會服務方面則增加快速及支出龐大。

政府的社會服務政策，可分為教育，健康，房屋及福利四大類。在教育方面，八年初級教育，大量擴展工業學院，理工等技術人員訓練學校，大專大學課程趨向實用，皆表明了教育是為經濟服務，通過考試，將不同能力的人分配到不同的經濟階層，學科的內容注重記憶，缺少現實生活的反映，英語作為教學媒介，使學習受到了障礙，其他類形的活動範圍受到一定的規限，故此學校未算能全面發展人格，在那裏只是接受了社會認可的一套意識形態。在居住方面，大量興建屋邨，希望市民能有較佳的居住環境，對香港產生歸屬感，但是由於能力未及供應太多的居所，故此這政策亦要放緩，但是，由於地產收益是政府的一個重要收益，及香港地少人多，政府亦同時限制土地供應，故而使到私人建設的租金高昂，影響了市民的生活。在健康方面，政府亦動用大量金錢，但是由於一個完善的醫療計劃，需要非常大量的金錢，故此目前還未能全面性地提供滿意的服務，但在較重要環節上則能提供勉強上滿意的醫療服務。在社會服務方面，皆進行詳細計劃，如社會保障，青少年康樂活動，社區發展等，行政趨向專業化及系統化，政府和其他志願團體分工，共同合作實施既定的服務項目，但是主要的社會服務，還是趨向集中於政府的幾個部門。推行最力

的可算是文娛康樂活動，務令青少年及市民有正當的活動，鼓勵他們服務社區，服務社會，但所舉辦的活動內容有一定的範圍，而缺乏思考性的活動，為使市民生活得到最低保障，實行了各種援助計劃，協助因天災人禍而受影響的市民，使市民產生歸屬感，力求社會得到穩定。此外，政府亦提倡各種文化活動，力求藝術普遍化，對於一些大眾化的文娛活動，亦加以協助發展。這些活動的反映由於和現實生活有分別，故此亦助長了個人主義的發展，不過對個人品德的陶冶卻有一定的幫助。

政府主動的組織民衆，成立各種基層組織，希望市民能參與建設社區，改善社區生活及關心周圍的環境，又推行各種運動，發動市民合力改善社會的風氣，及增進個人的公德心，對社會產生歸屬感。

政策的訂定，是需要依照實際的社會情況，故政府常常和各方面接觸，了解各方面所受到的影響及其可能之反應，由於政府的決策者缺少和普通市民生活上的接觸，故便需要民意表達途徑，使市民有表達意見的機會，及疏導任何不滿意的緒，故此成立了官式或非官式，直接或間接的民意表達途徑，這包括政府中常和市民接觸的部門投訴處，兩局非官守議員辦事處，民政署，報章，電台電視等，各自針對不同層次的意見，迎合不同市民的處理方法，甚至主動的接觸市民及民間團體，徵詢他們對某些政策的意見。透過教育及宣傳，鼓勵市民發表自己的意見，使市民善用已存的民意途徑及在市民能掌握的情況下漸漸擴大市民參與政策制定及推行的機會。但是，這個過程目前仍是十分謹慎及緩慢。

政府政策以安定社會，發展經濟及擴展教育為主，注重增進社會福利，鼓吹政府與市民共同建立一個健康和平的社會，並希望無論是大企業家或小市民都能明瞭共同合作的重要性，以共同的利益為重，在各方面共同建設及共同受利的情况下繁榮香港。在這同時，亦逐漸開放民意途徑，使市民有較大參與政治機會。作為香港的一份子，每個人均應關心自己的社區，善於表達自己的意見，以行動去改良不理想等事情以求達至一個較佳的社會。

香港民主意識初探

「民主」思想是包括民有 (of the people)，民享 (for the people)，民治 (by the people)。究竟香港羣衆對這三方面有否爭取？香港羣衆對於「民主」意識的認識又有多深？又最近社會行動之蓬勃又代表了甚麼？誠然，要將民主加深發展，政府之鼓勵及讓步是必須的，但羣衆之是否認識「民主」與及是否需要「民主」也是一個決定因素。

(甲) 影響香港人民民主意識之因素

(一) 中國傳統意識影響：

在香港絕大多數是中國人，雖然香港經過了百多年英國的殖民地統治，但香港在一定程度上仍保有中國傳統思想。中國傳統之政治意識是沒有民治 (by the people) 這回事的；他們認為祇有賢能才能治理國家，而不相信自己的參予也能起一個大作用。所謂「不在其位，不謀其政」，就是一個很明顯的例證。而「各家自掃門前雪」的思想，仍然留存在現今一般香港人心中。

（二）香港政治及文化背景

香港之特殊政治及文化背景也構成了民主意識低落之主因。香港居民大部分是大陸移民，尤以中年以上的居民，多是中國赤化後才逃至香港，這批第一代的大陸移民，其目的乃在於尋找一安定之所，他們大都仍保有國家鄉土觀念，而對香港缺乏歸屬感。至於第二代香港居民，在知識上比上一代豐富，歸屬感亦較強，但在政治參與方面卻不見得比上一代有很大的進展。這是由於香港本身沒有政治地位，而只有經濟上的地位；兼且香港在政治而非社會文化上屬於英國，在這情形下，一般青年人都缺乏文化身份之認同，因而對政治缺乏了醒覺性。

（三）經濟因素及傳播媒介

在經濟方面，香港的經濟繁榮，可由狂熱的消費主義顯示出來。香港工人只有「日頭猛做」來賺錢滿足需求，而在高度緊張之生活下，自然要「到依家輕鬆下」，追求物質享樂。於是沉醉消費及享樂主義，與埋首工作，便互相循環影響。在這情形下，他們那有閒去關心政治，爭取民主。而一般大眾傳播媒介亦多是以安定繁榮社會的中心，雖然偶然會對政府一些決策，或社會上不平等的東西提出控訴，但他們沒有對整個制度提出質詢，及鼓勵市民對「民主」之爭取，而且他們對社會的控訴，往往為其他娛樂新聞、狗馬經、笑片、武打片所掩蓋。

（四）正式與非正式教育

教育方面，香港教育課程呆滯，考試壓力大，都是人所共知的。填鴨式的教育，忽視了德育及正確價值觀的灌輸，青少年因而對社會國家缺乏深刻的認識，對政治冷漠，沒有積極爭取「民主」的意念。

在非正規教育方面，居民組織，社工等對各區市民灌輸政治意識，但都是局限於一小撮人。而六十年代後期的學生運動，及之後的羣眾運動，亦可使一般市民對「民主」的爭取有多一點的認識。

（乙）香港人現在的民主意識形態

在未深入分析香港人的民主意識形態之前，首先要了解香港人的政治文化（Political Culture），根據金耀基博士的「官塘區的政治文化調查」，只有大約一半受訪者對公眾及政府事務有所認識^①，大部份受訪者都傾向於傳統的以家庭為單位的觀念，只有社團領袖對家庭以外的公眾事務較為關心。另一方

面，關乎市民本身義務及責任方面，有部份受訪者表示全無認識。約60%表示並無多大興趣參與社會事務^②，而大部份人均認為在改善市民生活情況是政府的責任。

從以上的一些結果，可反映出香港人缺乏「民主」的基本概念——「民治」。一般市民缺乏參與政治的熱心，認為這是政府的責任。一般來說，香港羣眾是較處於被動，若政府有新措施頒佈，或對社會事件處理的方法，使市民覺得有不平等存在，或對個人利益有衝突時；有關市民亦會提出反對的意見，但政府接納與否，則市民亦只能有限度地干預。

至於「民有」、「民享」這兩方面，亦普遍不存於一般香港市民心中。這主要由於香港地位特殊，它的命運並不單單操於香港人手中，中國及英國兩方面都可對香港命運產生極大影響。同時香港的各種利益，亦並非全由一般市民分享，英國及中國都佔一部分，這些都形成一般市民對香港缺乏一個深厚的歸屬感。

（丙）羣眾運動的意義

六七年以後，羣眾運動漸趨蓬勃。一九六九年九月，珠海書院學生為了反對校方壓制言論，實行罷課靜坐兩天，他們這些行動很快為社會人士關注。其後的「盲人工潮」，「反貪污捉葛柏運動」，金禧事件^③及至最近的「工務員薪酬行動」等，在在顯示出羣眾運動的發展。

不論這些運動能夠達到目的與否，羣眾運動都存有一定的意義。綜合而言，一般香港的羣眾行動，都是側重於個人利益，對整個社會的建設性不大。大多數行動的發生，都是由直覺意識的驅使，只是一種對刺激的反應。當然，我們亦不能全然抹煞一些側重團體意識的社會行動，如中文運動，金禧事件等。不過這些仍是局限於一些知識份子及一小撮其他社會人士。總括而言，香港羣眾的社會意識仍有待發展。

（丁）總結

由於香港的特殊政治環境，及香港人本身的因素，使港人民意意識處於一較低水平。但要提高香港人的民主意識，却並不是一件容易的事，主要原因乃在於香港的政治前途並未明朗化，一般人都採取的觀望態度，轉注意於追求物質享樂，況且在四個現代化的大前題下，中國默許英國對香港的現行政策，因此若要提高香港人的民主意識，促進民主的發展，還有待大家的努力。

註釋：

①The political Culture of Kwun Tong: Chinese Community in Hong Kong—Dr. Ambrose King. P.5

②P.19.

民主在香港的前途

馮可立 整理：馮啓明

由於香港是英國的殖民地，所以我們要從殖民地的本質去分析民主問題。第二次世界大戰結束之後，一些殖民地首先提出了民族解放的口號，而不是民主，因為殖民地的最後出路是民族解放，是民族主義（Nationalism）的興起。但是民族主義在香港並沒有足夠的力量，於是在政治真空的情況底下，企圖改變政治現實的人們就提出了民主的要求。民主的意思就是政治參與，也是尊重對方表達意見的權利。在實際的環境中，政府往往是官僚的，是不對人民有反應的（Unresponsive to people）。政府官員甚至壟斷了人民的政治言論及行動自由，所以民主的對立面就是反官僚及反政治壟斷。

在任何的先進國家裏，都有著四類不同形式的民主行動。第一種方式是社會行動（Social Movement），意思是說某些人在地區性範圍內做著某些他們認為是保障他們權益的事，例如請願、遊行、示威等。社會行動的發展是地區性而小規模的。在政治幾何學上，我們叫它做「點」。「點」發展到「線」，

就是所謂壓力團體（Pressure Groups）。它們通常由一些小規模的政治行動擴展到一個比較統一的（Consistent），有前瞻的政治參與，而且它們多由專業人士組成，因為他們通常較為重視本身的權益。例如在一九七三年，教師就為了爭取薪酬而成立了教育專業人員協會。以前的壓力團體，如中華廠商會，香港總商會等，大多採用閉門談判的協商方式與政府進行交涉。但是現在，很多已轉用公開挑戰性的談判方式。像近期的地產商反對政府管制租金為例。政治「線」的再擴大就是政治的「面」。政治的「面」就是組織政黨（Political parties）。任何壓力團體的發展都是單線的，政黨却可以提出一套完整的社會政策。因此，政黨可說是壓力團體力量的擴張而至社會上的每一角落。「點」、「線」、「面」之後便是「體積」，政治幾何學上的「體積」便是全民投票。投票有著四種不同的權力，一是選舉權即是通過投票推選某人上台；二是罷免權，亦即是說政府官員的權力地位都是操縱在人民的手裏；三是創制權，即人民可以要求政府制定一套法律，而通過投票來奠定它的合法地位；四是否決權。任何投票都含有這四種權力之一。投票正是人民政治力量的最高表現方式。

香港目前的情況又怎樣？香港的社會行動開展於七十年代初。在這十年間，無論在力量上、形式上或人數上都有很大的發展。但是它的弱點是每當行動結束後，它們的力量便隨之消失，因此社會行動很難擴展到政治「線」的發展。香港的壓力團體本身發展並不理想，祇有三幾個較為特出的，如教育行動組、教協，一些公務員工會等，其他的壓力團體並不十分活躍。說到香港政黨的發展，它的興起可以追溯到第二次世界大戰結束後的初期。當時的港督楊慕琦（Young）提出一套方案，要將整個香港民主化。他的建議是將市政局改為市議會，將它的功能擴大到教育、房屋、社會福利等，議會的議員由全民投票選出。如果這個計劃實行成功，則殖民地政府便會逐步將權力移交人民。這個計劃在1946年提出，但在送交立法局後遭到否決。到了1952年，當時的殖民地事務大臣指出香港的政治狀況應維持原狀，不應有任何政制上的改變，於是整個計劃便胎死腹中。1947年，革新會成立，它們提出了一套比較完整的政治方案，支持楊慕琦的提議。此後，公民協會、「自由民主黨」等相繼成立。時至今日，香港幾個政黨的工作都不甚積極，而且因為缺乏羣眾基礎而不能起到應有的作用。到最後的選舉，大概在1973年，有二萬人簽名請願，要求港督批准葉錫恩進入立法局，但這個提議並沒有被立法局尊重。到了1978年，三位市議員上書英國殖民地事務大臣要求政制改變，但不得要領。由此可見，在政治「體積」上的幾次行動可說完全失敗！

既然社會行動在香港的發展這樣局限，壓力團體這樣稀少，政黨的力量又這樣薄弱，政治的聯繫（Political Linkage）便更形重要。若果沒有政治聯繫，任何民主運動都不能得到充份的發展。

總結以上所說，任何政治上的「點」、「線」、「面」或「體積」的聯繫都是一種進步。在這方面，知識份子及學生團體的政治教育便更形重要，因為他們不斷地輸送著有遠大眼光有抱負的青年去改革這個社會，使人民有更大的政治力量。（完）

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